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From the moment we are introduced to science we are told it is a cooperative, cumulative 
enterprise. Like the artisans who construct a building from blueprints, bricks, and mortar, 
scientists contribute to a common edifice called knowledge. Theorists provide the blueprints 
and researchers collect the data that are the bricks. 
To extent the analogy further, we might say that research synthesists are the 
bricklayers and the hodcarriers of the science guild. It is their job to stack the bricks 
according to plan and apply the mortar that holds the structure together 
Cooper and Hedges, The Handbook of Research Synthesis 
 
THE ASSETS, resources, knowledge, and capabilities that provide the basis for firm 
performance, survival and expansion do not often fully reside inside single firms. Instead, 
many of these factors are broadly distributed across a wide range of firms and institutions that 
span industry and geographical boundaries. For instance, when expanding abroad firms do 
not always have all the internal knowledge required to enter and operate successfully in a 
foreign market (e.g., Hennart, 1988). This knowledge is, instead, generally possessed by local 
firms which are familiar with the host country’s cultural norms and institutions. Similarly, in 
rapidly evolving industries technological knowledge and innovation are typically dispersed 
among competing firms, suppliers, universities, research laboratories, and customers (e.g., 
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). 
In recent decades, the dispersion of resources and capabilities among economic actors 
has led to an increase in the formation of strategic alliances as a primary mechanism for   2
exploiting interdependencies between organizations (e.g., Hennart, 1988; Gulati and 
Gargiulo, 1999). Strategic alliances are voluntary contractual agreements to govern the 
interorganizational coordination, sharing, exchange, or combination of assets, knowledge, 
capabilities, or activities. Alliances between organizations can take different forms, such as 
joint ventures, research and development agreements, or co-marketing partnerships, and may 
serve a variety of purposes, including international expansion, increasing market power, 
sharing risks, or obtaining economies of scale or scope (e.g., Hagedoorn, 1993; Hennart, 
1988). 
The volume of research on alliances in organization and strategy has paralleled their 
growth as modes of corporate development. Indeed, a large number of studies have been 
conducted investigating the antecedents of alliance formation, the choice of governance 
structure, the post-formation collaborative dynamics between the partners, and the 
performance outcomes of alliances (Gulati, 1998). A key premise underlying all these studies 
is the notion that alliances are formed to achieve economic gains and create value for the 
participating firms (Stuart, 2000). The research literature has investigated the performance 
outcomes of strategic alliances at two distinct levels of analysis (Gulati, 1998): (a) the 
performance of alliances themselves, where the alliance is the level of analysis, and (b) the 
performance effects of alliances for firms entering them, where the firm is the level of 
analysis. 
These two levels of analysis are associated with distinct streams of research that differ 
in several important ways. First, these two streams of research have investigated different 
dependent variables, emphasized different explanatory variables, and adopted different 
methodological approaches. Specifically, while research on the determinants of alliance 
performance has primarily emphasized the role of governance structure and 
interorganizational processes as key determinants, has been mainly based on survey methods,   3
and has used managers’ evaluations of alliance performance as the focal dependent variables, 
research on the link between alliance formation and firm value has emphasized the type of 
interdependency exploited in the cooperative venture and the collaborative conditions present 
at the inception of the alliance as key determinants, has been based on the event study 
method, and has adopted abnormal returns associated with alliance announcements as the 
focal dependent variable. 
Second, research also suggests that there is not always a one-to-one correspondence 
between alliance performance and the effect of strategic alliances on firm value (e.g., Gulati 
and Wang, 2003; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998). For example, research by Gulati and 
Wang (2003) has shown that although alliances may create value, relative value appropriation 
may differ between the partnering firms and alliance partners may not always extract 
commensurately equal value from the alliance. The results reported in Chapter 5 are also 
consistent with the notion that partners may benefit differentially from interorganizational 
cooperation. In particular, our results suggest, for instance, that partners that are active in a 
product-market domain that is moderately similar to that of the alliance is able to create more 
firm value than a partner that is active in a product-market domain unrelated to that of the 
alliance. Similarly, the link between alliance performance and its impact on firm value may 
also depend on the fit between the goal of the alliance and the firm’s strategy. For instance, 
an alliance may be successful but may not fit with the overall strategic direction of one or 
several of its parents. As a result, it may be discounted by investors. Conversely, a loss-
making alliance may result in a large increase in firm value because it is being milked by the 
parents through transfer pricing or because it is perceived by the market as having an 
important option value in terms of access to new markets or technologies. 
While individual studies have led to valuable insights on the performance outcomes of 
alliances and their determinants, the cumulative empirical evidence remains seemingly   4
inconclusive at both levels of analysis. At the alliance level, there is limited consensus on the 
factors that influence alliance performance. At the firm level, extant research has produced 
contradictory findings on whether, on average, firms benefit from entering alliances, and why 
some alliances create more value for the partnering firms than others. Thus, despite the 
pervasiveness of strategic alliances and extensive academic research on the performance 
outcomes of alliances important questions remain. 
In this dissertation, I use meta-analysis to clarify and integrate prior empirical 
research on the performance outcomes of strategic alliances. The purpose is to identify the 
consistencies that emerge from prior research and account for the variability in findings 
across studies and, in doing so, establish firm empirical generalizations on (a) the factors that 
influence the performance of alliances, and on (b) the average effect of strategic alliances on 
firm value, and the factors that determine it. In addition, I explore in this dissertation the 
boundaries and modifiers of these generalizations. 
Meta-analysis is a set of statistical procedures for quantitatively cumulating and 
synthesizing evidence from a large number of studies in a research literature. Meta-analysis 
provides a valuable method for integrating and interpreting research literatures, particularly 
when they contain contradictory findings (Cooper and Hedges, 1994). In meta-analysis, study 
findings are transformed to a common metric, which in management research is typically a 
correlation coefficient. Meta-analysis involves using statistical methods to estimate with 
precision the average level of an effect and to identify potential sources of variation in study 
findings. 
In the fields of organization and strategy, meta-analysis has been increasingly applied 
to establish empirical generalizations across a variety of research literatures (see Figure 1.1). 
Some examples include the link between diversification and firm performance (Palich, 
Cardinal, and Miller,  2000), the determinants of the impact of mergers and acquisitions on   5
firm value (King, Dalton, Daily, and Govin, 2004), and the relationship between the size of 
the board of directors and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, and Ellstrand, 1999). 
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A LOOK AHEAD 
The event study method has been the prevalent methodology to estimate the effects of 
individual strategic alliances on firm value (Gulati, 1998). In Chapter 2 we examine whether 
the magnitude of estimated stock market reactions to corporate events is sensitive to the event 
study methodology used. Results from a meta-analysis of 110 studies examining stock market 
reactions to 32,596 strategic alliance announcements show that estimated abnormal returns 
are influenced by the length of the event window. However, we also find that event study 
findings are remarkably robust to variations in the specification of the return-generating 
process, in the accommodation of possible confounding events, in the length and type of 
estimation window, and in the composition and time frame of the sample. 
Chapter 3 examines the link between alliance formation and firm value. Despite the 
large number of studies conducted to date, whether and under what conditions firms derive 
economic benefits from strategic alliances has not yet been firmly established. Chapter 3 
synthesizes two decades of empirical research to provide a systematic, quantitative analysis 
of the impact of strategic alliance formation on firm value. Our meta-analysis of 110 studies 
examining 32,596 strategic alliances formed between 1963 and 2001 leads to the strong 
conclusion that, on average, alliances create value for the partnering firms. Furthermore, our 
meta-analysis of 78 articles (83 independent samples; N = 15,439) investigating the effects of 
14 distinct factors that determine the impact of strategic alliances on firm value suggests that 
the type of resources exploited in the alliance, the collaborative conditions under which 
interorganizational cooperation takes place, and the experience of the partnering firms are 
key antecedents of value creation. We discuss the implications of these findings and offer 
directions for future research. 
The study of the determinants of alliance performance has been one of the most 
popular topics in the literature on strategic alliances. However, prior research has emphasized   7
the development and testing of new theory rather than the establishment of empirical 
generalizations and has produced inconsistent findings with respect to the relative 
contribution, magnitude, statistical significance, and direction of the determinants of alliance 
performance. Thus, despite extensive research no clear consensus exists regarding the 
antecedents of alliance performance. The research reported in Chapter 4 cumulates 78 
empirical studies and establish a quantitative synthesis of the influence of initial conditions, 
governance structure and post-formation dynamics on alliance performance. While Chapter 3 
focuses on the link between alliance formation and firm value, Chapter 4 investigates the 
performance of alliances themselves. By cumulating empirical evidence across a wide range 
of empirical studies we are able to establish firm empirical generalizations on the 
determinants of strategic alliance performance. Among other results, we find that three 
categories of variables (1) initial conditions, such as the extent to which the alliance pools 
complementary assets, knowledge, and activities, (2) governance structure, such as the level 
of interorganizational trust, and (3) post-formation dynamics between the alliance partners, 
such as information exchange and cooperative behavior, account for a significant proportion 
of the variation in alliance performance, with each of these three categories of variables 
accounting for approximately one third of the explained variation. In addition, of the nine 
antecedents of alliance performance investigated, the existence of prior ties, the level of trust, 
of information exchange, and of cooperative behavior between the alliance partners had, 
together with alliance age, the strongest direct effects on alliance performance. 
The final chapter of this dissertation, Chapter 5, summarizes the key findings and 
speculates on potential directions for future research.   8




DOES THE CHOICE OF EVENT STUDY 
METHODOLOGY IMPACT ESTIMATED 
ABNORMAL RETURNS? A META-ANALYTICAL 
INQUIRY 
 
EVENT STUDIES have become a predominant research methodology to investigate the 
impact of economic events on firm value. They have been applied in finance, accounting, 
management, economics, marketing, and law to estimate the financial effects of endogenous 
corporate events, such as earnings announcements, and of exogenous industry, regulatory and 
macroeconomic events (MacKinlay, 1997).  
To test the financial impact of events, extant empirical research has primarily 
employed the event study methodology introduced by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969). In this approach, the financial effects associated with the 
release of unanticipated information, termed abnormal returns, are measured as the difference 
between the observed event-day returns on a security and the estimated returns that would be 
expected in the absence of the event.  
Since these initial applications, a number of modifications and extensions of the event 
study methodology have been proposed (MacKinlay, 1997). These developments include 
                                                 
1 This chapter is the result of joint work with Tammo H.A. Bijmolt and Jean-François Hennart. We thank 
Rezaul Kabir, Marcel Pronk, Luc Renneboog and Bas Werker for helpful comments and suggestions. The list of 
studies included in this meta-analysis is provided in Appendix A. 
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methods that accommodate departures from the statistical assumptions underlying early event 
studies, and methods that extend this methodology to specific settings
2. These modifications 
to the classic event study design have been paralleled by considerable diversity in the 
methodologies that researchers have used to measure and test abnormal returns in empirical 
applications. In particular, empirical research employing the event study method varies not 
only in the extent to which the extensions to the original methodology have been 
implemented, but also in the type of model specification used to estimate expected returns, in 
the type and length of the estimation window, in the length of the event window, and in the 
decision of whether or not to control for confounding announcements (Peterson, 1989; 
MacKinlay, 1997). The multiplicity of event study methodologies that have been developed 
and the heterogeneity in how the method has been applied in empirical studies raise an 
important question: Does the choice of methodology influence event study findings? In other 
words, is the magnitude of estimated abnormal returns sensitive to variations in the event 
study methods used? This question is particularly important in light of research showing that 
event studies have produced inconsistent empirical findings regarding the impact on firm 
value of different types of corporate announcements such as mergers and acquisitions (King, 
Dalton, Daily, and Covin, 2004), and strategic alliances (e.g., Gulati, 1998), among others. In 
this paper we address this question by conducting a meta-analysis of 110 event studies 
examining the effects of strategic alliance announcements on firm value. While most 
previous studies have used simulation to investigate the power of event studies, we use meta-
analysis to examine how the magnitude of the impact of alliances on firm value may have 
been influenced by choices in research methodology and sample composition (Hunter and 
                                                 
2 For instance, methods have been devised to adjust for nonsynchronous trading in securities (Scholes and 
Williams (1977), Dimson (1979), and for clustering in event dates (Schipper and Thompson (1983), Collins and 
Dent (1984), to incorporate uncertainty in the event date (Ball and Tourous (1988), to account for event-induced 
variance in security returns (Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991), to test for abnormal security 
performance more accurately (Corrado (1989) and to conduct event studies in multi-country settings (Park 
2004).   11
Schmidt, 1990; Miller and Pollock, 1994). 
The study of the impact of methodological decisions on event study outcomes has 
important implications for the interpretation of past empirical evidence and for the design of 
event studies. First, it could be that contradictory findings on the impact of different types of 
economic events on firm value may, in part, be due to the use of different event study 
methods. Indeed, this is what Halpern (1983) suggested in his review of event studies on 
mergers and acquisitions. Because inconsistent findings are common in studies on various 
types of corporate events it is important to investigate the extent to which these divergences 
are due to the use of different event study methodologies. Second, when designing event 
studies to assess the effects of economic events on firm value, it is crucial to measure the 
magnitude of these effects accurately. For this reason it is important to understand whether 
and how different methodological choices influence estimated abnormal returns. 
Prior research has investigated how (a) distinct event conditions, such as the 
magnitude of abnormal returns, the level of uncertainty about the event date, or the degree of 
clustering in event dates, and (b) methodological choices concerning the specification of the 
return-generating model and test statistics, influence the power of event studies, that is, their 
ability to detect non-zero abnormal performance (e.g., Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985; 
Dyckman, Philbrik and Stephan, 1984). An overview of these prior studies is provided in 
Table 2.1. The present paper extends this line of research in three directions. First, while 
extant research has looked at how event conditions and methodological choices influence the 
statistical power of event studies, we consider whether and how they may influence the 
magnitude of estimated abnormal returns. This is a critical distinction because the purpose of 
event studies is not only to test for the significance of stock market reactions to economic 
events, but also to estimate the strength of such reactions. Second, we expand the scope of 
prior research by investigating the joint effects of a more comprehensive range of   12
methodological choices: (a) the decision of whether or not to control for confounding events, 
(b) the length of the event window, (c) the specification of the return-generating model, and 
(d) the length and type of the estimation window. The set of methodological choices 
investigated encompasses all those that researchers must make when designing event studies 
and that can potentially affect the results
3 (Peterson, 1989; MacKinlay, 1997). Third, prior 
studies have generally used simulation procedures to evaluate alternative event study 
methodologies. Simulation techniques require the ex-ante specification of the parameters 
characterizing the stock-market response to events which, in prior studies, has been 
constrained to fully occur on a single day and to be constant across all events. In contrast, we 
use meta-analysis to investigate the impact of distinct methodological choices on 554 
estimates of stock market reactions to 32,596 strategic alliances from 110 separate empirical 
studies. This has three main advantages: (1) because our analysis is based on event studies 
examining the financial impact of real events, our results reflect more closely the event 
conditions and statistical properties of actual market responses; (2) by analyzing real, as 
opposed to synthetically generated, event dates we are able relax the assumption of 
instantaneous market efficiency and conduct more valid tests for the effects of 
methodological choices on estimated abnormal returns, such as the length of the event 
window and the decision of whether to control for confounding events; (3) by analyzing a 
large number of primary studies, our tests incorporate a variety of empirical situations and 
research settings which allow us to account for the effect of sample characteristics in our 
analysis and to increase the generalizability of our findings. 
                                                 
3 We do not examine the methodological choices associated with the specification of the test statistic because 
they do not influence the magnitude or direction of estimated abnormal returns.   13
TABLE 2.1 
Overview of studies analyzing the impact of event conditions and methodological choices on event study findings 
This table provides an overview of prior research on the impact of event characteristics and methodological choices on event study 
findings. For each individuals study it describes: (a) whether the study is focused on explaining the influence of research methods on 
the power of event studies, the magnitude estimated abnormal returns or their significance; (b) the methodological approach used in 
each study; (c) the characteristics of the sample investigated; (d) the assumptions that each study made about the market response to 
corporate events; and (e) the types of event conditions and methodological choices investigated in each study. 
 
Study Focus  and 
Method 
Sample  Assumptions about 
Market Response  








N = 12,500  
Event type: Simulated 
events 
Return data: Monthly 
returns 
- Market reaction fully 
concentrated on a single 
month 
- Magnitude of abnormal 
returns: 0, 1, 5, 15, and 50% 
- Constant abnormal returns 
across all securities 
Event conditions (simulated) 
Magnitude of abnormal returns
* 
Event-date uncertainty with 21-month event window
* 
Clustering of event dates
* 












N = 12,500 
Event type: Simulated 
events 
Return data: Daily 
returns 
- Market reaction fully 
concentrated on a single day 
- Magnitude of abnormal 
returns: 0, 0.5, 1, and 2% 
- Constant abnormal returns 
across all securities 
Event conditions (simulated) 
Magnitude of abnormal returns
* 
Event-date uncertainty with 11-day event window 
* 
Non-normality of abnormal returns 
Clustering of event dates
* 
Non-synchronous trading 
Serial dependence in abnormal returns
* 
Cross-sectional dependence in abnormal returns
* 













N = 2,500 – 25,000  
Event type: Simulated 
events 
Return data: Daily 
returns 
- Market reaction fully 
concentrated on a single day 
Magnitude of abnormal 
returns: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5% 
- Constant abnormal returns 
across all securities 
Event conditions (simulated) 
Magnitude of abnormal returns
* 
Event-date uncertainty with 3- and 5-day event window 
* 
Non-normality of abnormal returns
* 
Non-synchronous trading 
Clustering of event dates
* 







 a*: MEAR, MAAR, MM, DB, SW   14
Thompson 
(1988) 




N = 2,790  
Event type: Simulated 
events 
Return data: Daily 
returns 
- Market reaction fully 
concentrated on a single day 
- Magnitude of abnormal 
returns: 1 and 5 % 
- Constant abnormal returns 















N = - 
Event type: Merger and 
acquisition 
announcements 
Return data: Daily and 
monthly returns 
  Sample selection 
Confounding events 
Length of Event window 








N = 1 – 200  
Event type: Simulated 
events 
Return data: Daily 
returns 
- Market reaction fully 
concentrated on a single 
month 
- Magnitude of abnormal 
returns: 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 % 
- Constant abnormal returns 
across all securities 
Event conditions (simulated) 
Magnitude of abnormal returns
* 













Replication of 3 
event studies 
N1 = 35; N2 = 34; N3 = 
39 
Event type: awards for 
affirmative action 
programs, firms found 
guilty of discrimination, 
and withdrawal from 
South Africa 
Return data: Daily 
returns 
  Sample selection 
Confounding events
† 
Length of Event window 
2-,3-,5-, 11-, and, 41-day windows
† 





N = 32,596  
Event type: Strategic 
alliance announcements 
Return data: Daily 
returns 
  Sample selection 
Confounding events 
Length of Event window 




 a*: MEAR, MAAR, MM, SW, PA, MFM 
Estimation period: length and type 
a MEAR = mean-adjusted returns, MAAR = market-adjusted returns, MM = market model, DB = Dimson betas, SW = Scholes-Williams betas, PA = portfolio 
approach, and MFM = multifactor model. 
* Significant influence on the power of event study; † Significant influence on the magnitude of estimated abnormal returns. 
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Our results show that the length of the event window systematically influences the 
magnitude of estimated abnormal returns. Specifically, the use of longer event windows tends 
to be associated with larger abnormal returns, suggesting a gradual adjustment of security 
prices to new information. Importantly, since studies generally vary in the length of event 
windows used to estimate and report abnormal returns, this implies that the existence of 
contradictory findings in extant empirical research may, in part, reflect the use of different 
event windows. On the other hand, our findings also show the event study methodology to be 
remarkably robust. We find that the magnitude of the impact of alliance announcements on 
abnormal returns does not significantly vary with the methodology used and the 
characteristics of the samples. Specifically, the exclusion of confounding events, the length of 
the estimation period, and the specification of the return-generating process do not have a 
significant influence on results. Furthermore, results of published studies do not significantly 
differ from those of unpublished ones. Results are also remarkably invariant to differences in 
the industrial composition of the samples. Finally, we find that the magnitude of stock market 
reactions to alliances announcements has been gradually increasing over time and that it is 
lower for firms listed on European and Japanese than for those listed on US stock exchanges. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The following section provides 
the theoretical background regarding the effects of different methodological choices on 
estimated abnormal returns. The next section then describes the data and methodology used 
in this study. The third section reports the results of our empirical analysis. The fourth section 
concludes. 
METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES IN EVENT STUDY DESIGN 
In this section we discuss how alternative event study methodologies may influence 
estimated abnormal returns. In event studies, the impact of economic events on firm value is 
estimated as the difference between the observed returns during the event window and the  
  16
normal returns expected to occur in the absence of the event. Thus, estimated abnormal 
returns may be influenced by two broad classes of methodological choices: (1) choices that 
may influence the actual returns observed during the event window, and (2) choices that may 
influence the estimation of expected normal returns. The former include the length of the 
event window and the treatment of confounding events, while the latter may hinge on the 
specification of the return-generating process, and the length and type of the estimation 
window. We now discuss how each of these design choices may influence the magnitude of 
estimated abnormal returns. 
Event Window 
Event studies focus on the measurement of stock market reactions to events. Thus, the 
accurate identification of the event date is an important methodological issue in their design. 
In event studies, the event date is typically operationalized as the date of the first public 
release of new information in financial publications such as the Wall Street Journal. 
However, several factors may make it difficult to identify with certainty the exact date at 
which the event has occurred. First, the market may have had access to event-related 
information in other forms prior to its publication in the media. Second, the stock market 
reaction to the event may extend over a number of days following the event date. This occurs, 
for instance, when trading can only take place on the day following the public release of 
event-related information or when new information about the event becomes gradually 
available after the initial announcement date. 
Four alternative procedures have been developed to account for uncertainty in the 
event date (Dyckman et al., 1984; Ball and Torous, 1988). The first approach consists of 
defining an event window containing the minimum number of days in which the event date 
may have occurred, and then randomly choosing the event date by using a uniform 
probability distribution. The second deals with event-date uncertainty by using daily returns  
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to estimate the parameters of the return-generating model, and then accumulating daily 
abnormal returns over an expanded event window which comprises the event date and other 
contiguous days in which stock market reactions may have occurred. The third procedure 
uses the security returns over a multi-day period to estimate model parameters, and 
accumulates abnormal returns over this multi-day period. The fourth approach, developed by 
Ball and Torous (1988), is a maximum likelihood event-study method that incorporates the 
possibility of event-date uncertainty. 
Dyckman et al. (1984) used simulation techniques to investigate the ability of the first 
three alternative methods to detect abnormal returns. Their results indicated that, under 
conditions of event-date uncertainty, accumulating abnormal returns over extended event 
windows provides more statistical power to detect abnormal returns than a random selection 
of the event date. In addition, they found no additional gains in power associated with the use 
of multi-day event windows. Ball and Torous (1988) compared the second and fourth 
approaches and found that both had similar statistical power and thus that no significant gains 
arise from the use of a more complex estimation framework. Consistent with these findings, 
event studies generally deal with event-date uncertainty by adopting the second approach 
which involves accumulating abnormal returns over an event window comprising multiple 
days around the announcement date. 
However, this procedure has also limitations. Simulation studies by Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985), Dyckman et al. (1984), and MacKinlay (1997) have consistently shown 
that, although the use of longer event windows is preferable to the random selection of an 
event date, increasing the length of the event window still considerably decreases the 
statistical power of an event study relative to the use of shorter event windows. Previous 
research also suggests that the length of the event window may influence the magnitude of 
the observed abnormal returns. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) investigated these effects by  
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reexamining three event studies on corporate social responsibility. They found that, for this 
limited sample of studies, the size of the event windows influenced the magnitude of 
estimated abnormal returns. 
Uncertainty in the event date would suggest that larger event windows would capture 
more accurately the full effects of specific events on firm value and would thus lead to larger 
observed abnormal returns in absolute value. However, extending event windows beyond the 
period required to capture stock market reactions to information released prior to, or 
immediately following, the event date may dilute the estimated effects on firm value due to 
the inclusion of security returns for days not influenced by the event. Thus, since short event 
windows account for event-day uncertainty and are also less likely to include security returns 
not affected by the event, they should be associated with larger abnormal returns in absolute 
value than relatively broader event windows. 
Confounding Events 
Event studies are based on the assumption that the estimated abnormal returns are 
caused by a particular event. This assumption provides the foundation for interpreting results 
and for inferring causality in event studies. However, the validity of this assumption is 
contingent on the non-occurrence of other events close to the event date. Specifically, when 
other confounding events that influence firm value occur during the event window, they 
distort the link between the event of interest and abnormal returns. Confounding events result 
from all releases of unanticipated information that have an economic impact on the focal 
firm, such as earnings announcements. The presence of confounding events may lead to the 
dilution or reinforcement of the estimated abnormal returns, increasing the probability of 
rejecting the presence of an effect when it exists (type II error) or that of identifying an effect 
when it does not (type I error) (Meznar, Nigh, and Kwok, 1998). Dilution occurs when the 
impact of confounding effects on firm value is random across the sample of firms, or when  
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confounding events have a systematic effect on firm value that works contrary to the event of 
interest. Reinforcement occurs when the stock market impact of confounding events is 
systematic and in the same direction as the event of interest. 
Foster (1980) identified several alternative approaches to control for confounding 
events. The first consists in partitioning the firms in the sample on the basis of the type of 
confounding events that have occurred during the event window, and estimating the separate 
effects of the confounding events on firm value. An alternative approach consists of 
excluding from the sample firms that have experienced confounding events. A third 
procedure involves excluding from the sample the days when confounding events have 
occurred. This solution may lead to an underestimation of the impact of the focal event on 
firm value when the information released in the confounding event is related to that event. A 
fourth alternative consists of correcting the observed abnormal returns by subtracting the 
estimated financial impact of the confounding events. A final procedure assumes that, under 
conditions of temporal dispersion of event dates and variation in the type and expected 
impact of confounding events, the net effect of confounding events is minimal and, therefore, 
that no control is required. Event studies have typically adopted the second approach, 
excluding from the sample firms that have confounding events, or the fifth one, not 
controlling for such events. Indeed, our review of the empirical literature on stock market 
reactions to strategic alliance announcements indicates that in this research literature only 
these two methods have been used to control for confounding events. 
Prior research provides conflicting evidence on the impact of confounding events on 
the magnitude of the observed abnormal returns. In a meta-analysis of 41 event studies using 
monthly and daily returns to estimate the stock market reactions to mergers and acquisitions, 
Datta, Pinches, and Narayanan (1992) found that estimated abnormal returns for bidders were 
marginally higher in studies that did not control for confounding events relative to those that  
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excluded confounding events from the sample. McWilliams and Siegel (1997) reexamined 
three event studies on corporate social responsibility and found that failing to account for 
confounding events led to significantly larger abnormal returns for all studies. However, in 
general, the direction and size of the bias introduced by confounding events will depend on 
the extent to which they tend to be random or systematic, and how they will affect abnormal 
returns is hard to predict a priori. 
Return-Generating Process: Model Specification 
The measurement of abnormal returns requires the estimation of normal returns, that 
is, the expected security returns in the absence of the economic event under study. There are 
several methodologies available for modeling a firm’s normal returns. The market model is 
most frequently used (MacKinlay, 1997). It assumes that the normal return for a given 
security is a linear function of the contemporaneous market return. The market model for 
security i is: 
 R it = αi + βi Rmt + εit (1) 
where Rit and Rmt are the returns for security i and the market portfolio m in period t, 
respectively, αi and βi are the intercept and market beta coefficient for security i, and εit is the 
disturbance term for security i in period t, with E[εit] = 0 and Var[εit] = σi
2. 
In principle the model parameters αi and βi are to be estimated based on empirical 
market data or alternatively constrained to a certain value. Two model specifications of the 
return-generating process, the mean-adjusted returns model and the market-adjusted returns 
model, involve imposing restrictions on market model parameters. The mean-adjusted returns 
model is based on the assumption that the normal return for each security is constant over 
time. This implies that securities are not sensitive to market returns and, thus, that βi is 
constrained to be zero. In contrast, the market-adjusted returns model assumes that all 
securities generate normal returns equal to the return on the market index for the period under  
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consideration. Therefore, in the market-adjusted returns model αi and βi are constrained to 
zero and unity, respectively. 
Methodological extensions of the market model have been developed to correct for 
potential biases in the estimation of its parameters arising from nonsynchronous trading of 
securities (Scholes and Williams, 1977; Dimson, 1979). The market model has also been 
extended to include other factors in addition to stock market indexes
4 (MacKinlay, 1997). 
These multifactor models may include indexes based on industry classification (Thompson, 
1988), global market movements (Park, 2004), or macro-economic factors, such as interest 
rates (Chang, 1991), exchange rate movements (Park, 2004), and inflation (Roll, 1992). 
The control portfolio methodology provides an alternative approach to adjust a 
security’s observed return for market influences during the event window. This methodology 
assumes that the return-generating process is equivalent across firms similar in market value 
of equity (Fama and French, 1992), market beta coefficient (Brown and Warner, 1980), or 
industry membership (MacKinlay, 1997). Therefore, abnormal returns are estimated as the 
difference between the observed return for the focal firms and the return for a control 
portfolio comprising similar firms without event announcements. 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), and Dyckman et al. (1984) have examined the 
influence of these alternative ways of modeling normal returns on the statistical power of 
event studies. Their results consistently indicate that model specification has little or no 
impact on the power to detect abnormal returns. However, prior research has not addressed 
the extent to which they affect the magnitude of estimated abnormal returns. 
                                                 
4 The choice of market index may influence estimated abnormal returns (Brown and Warner (1980). Since 
market indexes potentially differ in the degree to which they are correlated with security returns, they may lead 
to different model parameters and to different estimates of normal returns. In our sample, most of the variation 
among studies in the type of market index used was associated with differences in the nationality of the firms 
being investigated. Accordingly, event studies based on the same country did not generally differ in their choice 
of market index. Because in our sample the choice of market index is empirically confounded with country 
effects we do not explicitly model the influence of market index on estimated abnormal returns.  
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Estimation Period 
The parameters of the return-generating model are estimated using return information 
for a period of time that may include, precede, follow, or surround the event window. The 
specification of this estimation period may influence the predicted normal returns and, 
therefore, the magnitude of the observed abnormal returns. Specifically, the impact of the 
estimation period on estimated abnormal returns is contingent on the stability of the return-
generating process parameters over time. In particular, the extent to which the parameters of 
the return-generating model estimated for the entire estimation period are valid for the event 
window influences the accuracy of the predicted normal returns. Transitory or permanent 
shifts in the parameters of the return-generating process may occur during the estimation 
period, or during the event window as a consequence of the event. Long estimation periods 
increase predictive accuracy of the return-generating model by attenuating the relative 
influence of transitory parameter shifts, and by reducing the estimated standard errors when 
parameter estimates are stable during the estimation window. Conversely, short estimation 
periods that are close to the event window increase the sensitivity of parameter estimates to 
shifts in the return generating process. Thus, short estimation periods improve the ability to 
predict normal returns when permanent parameter shifts occur during the estimation period. 
Event studies have used estimation periods that combine pre-event and post-event data to 
increase predictive accuracy when parameter shifts are triggered by the event of interest 
(Peterson, 1989). 
In sum, in the absence of parameter shifts, the length and type of estimation periods 
should have no influence on observed abnormal returns. In contrast, estimation periods that 
are short and include post-event data should provide more accurate estimates of abnormal 
returns when parameter shifts occur during the estimation period or the event window.  
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DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
To investigate the impact of alternative event study methodologies on the magnitude 
of estimated abnormal returns we conducted a meta-analysis of event studies examining the 
effect of strategic alliance announcements on firm value.  
Meta-analysis is a statistical procedure for integrating the results of a large number of 
empirical studies (Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). By using the results 
of each estimate of the abnormal returns associated with strategic alliance announcements as 
a data point, we can use meta-analysis to test whether the use of certain methods leads to 
systematic variations in the magnitude of abnormal returns while controlling for sample 
characteristics (Miller and Pollock, 1994). 
Strategic alliances are voluntary contractual agreements for governing horizontal or 
vertical exchanges between firms, and may serve a variety of motives such as market entry or 
new product development (Hennart, 1988). They can take a multitude of equity and non-
equity forms such as joint ventures or licensing agreements, and their incentive structure 
differs from other alternative governance mechanisms, such as spot market transactions or 
complete ownership through internal development or acquisitions (Hennart, 1988). We focus 
on strategic alliances because they have attracted a large volume of empirical research using 
the event study method, and are a prevalent mode of corporate development (Gulati, 1998). 
In fact, between 1990 and 1999 Fortune 100 companies announced more than twice as many 
alliances (6,620) than acquisitions (2,936) (McGahan and Villalonga, 2003). 
Prior empirical research on the impact of strategic alliances on firm value has 
produced inconsistent results: while some studies have found that the announcement of 
strategic alliances creates value for the participating firms (e.g., Chan, Kensinger, Keown, 
and Martin, 1997), others have found it destroys it (e.g., Lee and Wyatt, 1990). Importantly, 
our review of the literature also indicates that individual studies have differed considerably in  
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the methodological choices researchers have made to estimate the abnormal returns 
associated with alliance announcements. Thus, by using meta-analysis we can investigate 
whether the choice of event study methodology accounts for the variability in study results. 
Literature Search 
We combined multiple search strategies to identify published and unpublished 
empirical studies that used the event study methodology to evaluate the impact of strategic 
alliance announcements on firm value. First, articles were identified through a computer 
bibliographic search of electronic databases. ABI/Inform, Econlit, JSTOR, Kluwer Online, 
Science Direct, and the Social Science Citation Index were searched using the keywords 
“joint venture(s)”, “strategic alliance(s)”, “performance”, “event study”, “shareholder value”, 
“abnormal return(s)”, “wealth effect(s)”, “residual(s)”, “prediction error(s)”, “excess 
return(s)”, “announcement(s)”, and “firm value”. Second, we performed manual searches 
(over the 1980 to 2004 period) of relevant journals in finance, accounting, management, and 
marketing (Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of 
Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of International Business Studies, Journal 
of Management, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, Strategic 
Management Journal). Third, we performed Internet searches using standard search engines. 
Fourth, we requested working papers from authors of previous event studies. Finally, we 
examined the reference sections of all the articles retrieved and of prior narrative reviews of 
the strategic alliance literature (Gulati, 1998; Merchant, 2000). 
Studies were considered eligible for the meta-analysis if they reported on the effects 
of strategic alliance announcements on firm value, measured in abnormal returns. In addition, 
to be included in our database, the study had to be based on daily returns. This search process 
yielded 110 empirical studies (including 34 unpublished papers) from which we obtained 554 
estimates of the impact of strategic alliances announcements on firm value. Because some  
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studies provided information on more than one independent sample, our analysis is based on 
140 independent samples with a total sample size of 32,596 strategic alliances announced 
between 1963 and 2001. 
Coding 
For each study, two judges independently coded all relevant information, as detailed 
below. The level of interrater reliability for coding decisions was 97%. Inconsistencies were 
resolved through discussion. 
The judges coded the sample size and the abnormal returns for the parent firms over 
eight distinct event windows ranging from the day of the strategic alliance announcement 
(day 0) to a 21-day window surrounding the announcement day. They also coded the 
methodology used and the sample characteristics. The methodological variables coded were 
(a) the length of the event window, (b) the length of the estimation period, (c) whether the 
estimation period preceded the event window or also included a post-event period, (d) the 
model specification of the return-generating process, and (e) whether confounding events 
were excluded from the sample. The variables characterizing the sample included (f) the 
mean year of the alliance announcements included in the sample, (g) the percentage of 
strategic alliances in manufacturing industries, and (h) the country of the stock exchange in 
which the announcing firms were listed. Controlling for the sample characteristics of the 
event study allows us to empirically examine the consistency of results across a wide range of 
countries, time periods, and industry settings. Finally, we tested for the presence of 
publication bias and therefore coded (i) the publication status of the study (published vs. 
unpublished). Publication bias is present if the probability that a study is published is 
contingent on the magnitude, direction or significance of the study’s results (Begg, 1994).  
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Meta-Analysis Model 
To investigate the influence of methodological choices on the magnitude of estimated 
abnormal returns, we separately modeled the abnormal returns obtained for event window l in 
study k (ARlk) as a function of a set of methodological choices and sample characteristics, 
denoted as Xj,lk (Hedges and Olkin, 1985; Stanley, 2001). Most studies in our sample report 
estimates of the abnormal returns associated with strategic alliances for multiple event 
windows of varying lengths. Since these distinct events windows generally overlap, 
individual estimates from the same study are not independent. Therefore, in order to obtain 
accurate estimates of the effects of methodological choices and sample characteristics on 
event study findings, we need to account for within-study dependency between the abnormal 
returns estimated for different event windows. Hierarchical linear models, also termed 
multilevel models, provide a statistical method for directly modeling the dependency between 
multiple estimates of abnormal returns obtained from the same study (Raudenbush and Bryk, 
2002). Hierarchical linear models are random-coefficient regression models for analyzing 
nested data structures, such as event windows within studies. In hierarchical models the 
effects of variables associated with different levels of the hierarchy are simultaneously 
estimated. In addition, because effect sizes based on larger samples contain less sampling 
error, we use the sample size as a weight in our analysis (Rosenthal, 1991). In particular, we 
separately estimated the following weighted hierarchical linear model (Bijmolt and Pieters, 
2001):  
  k lk
J
j
lk j j lk u e X AR + + + = ∑
=1
, 0 γ γ  (2) 
where we assume that the within-study error components elk, and the between-study 
error components uk are normally distributed with zero mean and variances ς
2 and τ
2, 
respectively. Prior to estimating the hierarchical linear model we examined potential 
collinearity between the measures capturing the event study methodology and sample  
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characteristics. Examination of variance inflation factors (VIF) and conditioning index (CI) 
statistics indicated a low level of collinearity with no important effects for model estimation 
(maximum VIF = 6.03, maximum CI = 5.942). This result suggests that there is little co-
variation among distinct methodological choices and sample characteristics, indicating that in 
prior event studies on strategic alliances methodological choices are generally been made 
independently of each other. This supports our goal of investigating how the choice of event 
study methodology impacts the estimated abnormal returns across a wide range of event 
conditions, methodological choices and research settings. 
RESULTS 
Study Characteristics 
Figure 2.1 presents the frequency distribution of the estimated abnormal returns 
associated with strategic alliance announcements. The mean estimated abnormal return is 
0.74 percent (median = 0.52), and the standard deviation is 1.22 indicating substantial 
variation in study findings. In addition, 83 percent of the estimated abnormal returns are 
positive. Table 2.2 shows how event study methodology and sample characteristics vary 
across the 554 estimates of the effect of strategic alliances on firm value in our sample. There 
is greater heterogeneity between studies in the length of the estimation period and in the 
treatment of confounding events than in model specification and in the type of estimation 
period adopted. Specifically, most studies model normal returns using a market model 
specification estimated on the basis of historical security returns for a period of time 
preceding the event. In terms of empirical context, studies capture a wide range of industries 
and time periods, but are skewed heavily toward analyzing the financial effects of strategic 




Frequency distribution of estimated abnormal returns 
This figure reports the frequency distribution of 554 estimates for the abnormal returns 
associated with strategic alliance announcements for 32,596 strategic alliances formed 



























































Application of Event Study Methodology in Strategic Alliance Research 
This table provides an overview of the how the event study method has been applied to 
investigate the impact of strategic alliance announcements on firm value. It reports the 
number of empirical tests based on different choices of event study methodology and sample 
characteristics. Variables pertaining to the event study methodology include: the length of the 
event window, the decision of whether or not to control for confounding events, the model 
specification of the return-generating process, the type of estimation period, and the length of 
the period used to estimate the parameters of the return-generating model. Variables 
pertaining to sample characteristics include: the time frame of the sample (mean year of the 
alliance announcements included in the sample), the nationality of the firms announcing 
strategic alliances, the percentage of strategic alliance announcements in manufacturing, and 
the whether the study was published or unpublished. 
 
Event Study Methodology  Number 
of 
Estimates
Sample Characteristics  Number 
of 
Estimates
Event Window    Country   
  0 (announcement day)  81    U.S.  432 
 (-1,0)  117   Europe  74 
 (0,1)  77   Japan  20 
  (-1,1)  85    Australia, South-East Asia  28 
  (-2,2)  60  Percentage of Alliances in 
Manufacturing 
 
 (-3,3)  43   0  to  55  164 
  (-5,5)  44    56 to 70  242 
  (-10,10)  47    71 to 100  148 
Confounding events    Year of Announcement   
  Not controlled for  267    1975-1979  66 
 Controlled  for  287   1980-1984  92 
Model Specification      1985-1989  141 
  Market Model   403    1990-1994  186 
 Mean  Adjusted  Returns  21   1995-2000  69 
   Market Adjusted Returns  12  Publication Status   
 Scholes-Williams  Betas  38   Unpublished  121 
 Multifactor  Model    28   Published  433 
   Portfolio approach  52     
Type of Estimation Period       
 Pre-event  period  492     
  Pre- & Post-event period  62     
Length of Estimation Period (in 
days) 
    
  45 to 120  167     
  121 to 150  174     
  151 to 200  102     
  201 to 662  111      
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Effect of Strategic Alliances on Firm Value 
  We first estimated a random-effects model that includes only an intercept term. This 
model provides a baseline against which to compare more complex models. Our findings, 
presented in Table 2.3 (Model 1) indicate that the variance is 39.20 at the within-study level 
and 1.28 at the between study-level. This corresponds to an intra-study correlation of 0.97, 
indicating that, as expected, abnormal returns obtained from the same study are highly 
correlated and, therefore, that a hierarchical linear model should be estimated to account for 
this dependency. Finally, the intercept provides an estimate of the overall magnitude of the 
abnormal returns associated with strategic alliance announcements that also corrects for 
within-study dependency between the observed abnormal returns. The parameter estimate of 
0.80 (p < 0.001) indicates that, on average, strategic alliances create shareholder value as they 
result in an increase of 0.80 percent in abnormal returns. 
Effects of Event Study Methodology on Research Findings 
We now examine whether and how the use of particular methodologies and sample 
characteristics influence the magnitude of abnormal returns by estimating a hierarchical 
linear model that includes all predictor variables (Model 2, Table 2.3). To evaluate model fit 
we compare the deviance (-2 times the log-likelihood) of the full model (Model 2) with the 
deviance of the baseline model (Model 1). The difference between these deviances is 
distributed asymptotically as chi-square, with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in 
the number of parameters estimated (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). The deviance statistics of 
the full model (1234.0) compares favorably with the baseline random-effects model (1309.3) 
indicating an increase in model fit (χ
2(24) = 75.3, p < 0.001).  
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TABLE 2.3 
Regression Analysis of Estimated Abnormal Returns on Event Study 
Methodology and Sample Characteristics 
This table reports the results from a weighted hierarchical linear regression analysis of the 
estimated abnormal returns associated with strategic alliance announcements obtained for 
event window l in study k (ARlk). Regressors include two sets of variables. The first set of 
variables includes the following characteristics pertaining to the event study methodology 
used in each article to estimate abnormal returns: dummy variables indicating the length of 
the event window, a dummy variable indicating whether confounding events were excluded 
from the sample of strategic alliance announcements, dummy variables indicating the return-
generating model specification used to estimate normal returns, a dummy variable indicating 
whether the estimation period includes both pre- and post-event periods, and the length of the 
period used to estimate the parameters of the return-generating model. The second set of 
variables includes the following characteristics of the sample of strategic alliance 
announcements used in each study: dummy variables indicating the mean year of the alliance 
announcements included in the sample, dummy variables for the nationality of the firms 
announcing strategic alliances, the percentage of strategic alliance announcements in 
manufacturing, and a dummy variable indicating whether the study was published in a peer-
reviewed journal. Each parameter was weighted by the study’s sample size. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 
 
 Model   
   1   2 
Event Window     
 (-1,0)    0.270
*** a 
(0.063) 
 (0,1)    0.221
*** a 
(0.068) 
 (-1,1)    0.445
*** b 
(0.066) 
 (-2,2)    0.459
*** b 
(0.073) 








 (-10,10)    0.649
*** c 
(0.085) 
Confounding events    0.142 
(0.090) 
Model Specification     
 Mean  Adjusted  Returns    0.624 
(0.651) 
 Market  Adjusted  Returns    0.652 
(0.525) 
 Scholes-Williams  Betas    0.338 
(0.461) 
 Multifactor  Model      -0.194 
(0.197)  
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   Portfolio approach    -0.225 
(0.497) 
Estimation Period     
  Pre- & Post-event period    -0.562 
(0.428) 




Country    
 Europe    -0.814
** 
(0.334) 
 Japan    -1.276
*** 
(0.305) 
  Australia, South-East Asia    -0.230 
(0.492) 
Percentage of Alliances in Manufacturing    -0.516 
(0.404) 
Year of Announcement     
 1980-1984    -0.183 
(0.479) 
 1985-1989    0.335 
(0.422) 
 1990-1994    0.260 
(0.431) 
 1995-2000    0.844
* 
(0.475) 







    
-2 log likelihood    1309.3
***  1234.0
*** 
Chi-square   487.72
***  504.22
*** 
N   554    554 
Within-study variance    39.20
***   29.89
*** 
Between-study variance    1.28
***   1.52
*** 
***, **, * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
a,b,c Values sharing a superscript are not significantly different at the 5 percent level.  
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First, our findings show that the length of the event window influences the magnitude 
of estimated abnormal returns. We assessed whether the magnitude of estimated abnormal 
returns differed across the various event windows by testing a series of equality constraints 
between the regression coefficients associated with the different event windows (Verbeek, 
2000; p. 25). We find that the use of longer event windows is associated with larger estimates 
of abnormal returns, but that this effect levels off beyond a 7-day period surrounding the 
event. Thus, rather than information associated with strategic alliance announcements being 
instantaneously incorporated in security prices, markets appear to react gradually to this type 
of corporate event. This result has important implications as it suggests that the length of the 
event window is an important consideration when interpreting study findings and comparing 
results from different studies. Specifically, our results show that contradictory evidence 
regarding the effect of corporate events, such as strategic alliances, on firm performance may 
be at least partially explained by variations in the length of the event window used to estimate 
these results. Hence, it is important to estimate and report abnormal returns over multiple 
event windows of increasing lengths to ensure that the market has fully absorbed the effects 
of corporate events on security prices. In the case of strategic alliances, our results show that 
these event windows must extend to a 7-day period surrounding the announcement day. 
Because alliances are, in their volume, complexity and implications, comparable to other 
modes of organizational expansion and contraction, this finding may generalize to other types 
of corporate announcements. Hence the inconsistent results found in prior research on the 
financial effects of corporate events such as divestitures (Meznar, Nigh, and Kwok (1998) or 
mergers and acquisitions (King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin, 2004), may be in part due to 
variations in the reported event windows. Thus, when comparing results across studies 
researchers should consider the length of the event window as an important source of 
variability in empirical findings.  
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Second, contrary to both our expectations and to the findings of prior research based 
on the replication of individual studies (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997), controlling for 
confounding effects appears to have no significant impact on the magnitude of estimated 
abnormal returns. A potential explanation for this result may be that few unanticipated events 
confounded the strategic alliance announcements in the included samples. Alternatively, this 
result may also be interpreted as indicating that confounding events are randomly distributed 
across strategic alliance announcements with an expected value of zero. Importantly, this 
suggests that event study findings are robust to the presence of confounding events. In other 
words, the assumption made by many event studies that confounding events were absent or 
non-influential seems to be, on average, correct. This matters because excluding potentially 
confounded observations, a method often used to handle confounding events, may introduce 
selection biases in the sample, as the presence of potentially confounding corporate events 
may be related to a number of organizational characteristics such as firm size. 
Third, our results indicate that the use of alternative model specifications has no 
significant effect on the magnitude of observed abnormal returns. Brown and Warner (1985) 
and Dyckman et al. (1984), using simulation, found that alternative specifications of the 
return-generating process tend to have similar statistical power  for detecting abnormal 
returns. Here we show that this conclusion also applies to the magnitude of estimated 
abnormal returns and to a broad set of model specifications including multifactor models and 
the portfolio approach. 
Event studies in our sample differ in both type and length of estimation period. We 
find that including post-announcement observations in the estimation period does not have a 
significant influence on estimated abnormal returns. This finding shows that either alliance 
announcements do not generally cause significant parameter shifts during the event window, 
or that event study methodologies are robust to such shifts. Similarly, we find that the length  
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of the estimation period has no significant influence on the magnitude of estimated abnormal 
returns. This suggests that model parameters are generally stable over time, and that the 
choice of the length of the estimation period is not critical to capture a security’s return 
dynamics. 
Sample Characteristics 
We now examine whether sample characteristics influence estimated abnormal 
returns. First, results from the hierarchical linear model (Model 2, Table 2.3) indicate that 
estimated abnormal returns have gradually increased over time
5 (year of announcement), with 
strategic alliances announced between 1995 and 2000 having a higher impact on market 
value than those announced in earlier periods. One possible explanation is that firms have 
generally become better at creating value in strategic alliances, i.e. that they are now more 
successful at identifying complementarities with other firms, choosing appropriate 
governance structures, and managing interfirm collaboration. Alternatively, these results may 
also reflect a gradual change in investors’ subjective response to strategic alliance 
announcements.  
Second, our results for the country of the parent firms suggest that listing location and 
thus stock market characteristics do influence the magnitude of estimated abnormal returns. 
Specifically, we find that stock market reactions to strategic alliance announcements tend to 
be lower for firms listed on European and Japanese than for firms listed on US stock 
exchanges. We assessed whether stock market reactions to alliance announcements differed 
between firms listed on European as opposed to Japanese stock exchanges by testing the null 
hypothesis of equality between their respective regression coefficients (Verbeek, 2000). Our 
analysis revealed that no significant differences exist between these two economic regions. 
Third, we find that the industry composition of the sample (i.e., the proportion of 
                                                 
5 We also used three- and seven-year windows and the results remained unchanged. These analyses are available 
from the authors upon request.  
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manufacturing firms in the sample) has no significant effect on estimated abnormal returns. 
This indicates that results are fairly similar between manufacturing and service 
industries. 
Publication Bias 
We examine the presence of a publication bias by investigating whether there are 
systematic differences in abnormal returns between published and unpublished studies. Table 
2.3 (Model 2) shows that this is not the case, which supports the absence of a publication 
bias. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The event study method has been used to investigate a wide range of topics in finance, 
accounting, economics, industrial organization, law, and management. However, empirical 
studies differ considerably in the particular event study methodology employed. This variety 
reflects not only the development of many modifications to the event study method since the 
pioneering works of Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969), but also differences in 
the methodological choices made by researchers. The diversity in methodological practices 
raises an important question regarding the interpretation of past event studies and the design 
of new ones, namely whether and how the choice of event study methodology influences the 
magnitude of estimated abnormal returns. In the present paper, we perform a meta-analysis of 
554 estimates of stock market reactions to strategic alliance announcements to explore 
whether a number of methodological choices affect the magnitude of estimated abnormal 
returns. These choices include (a) the length of the event window, (b) the decision to exclude 
confounding events, (c) the model specification of the return-generating process, and (d) the 
type and length of the estimation period. 
We obtain several important results. First, we find that the use of longer event 
windows is associated with larger estimated abnormal returns. Therefore, rather than being  
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instantaneous, stock market reactions to alliance announcements appear to unfold gradually 
over a period of 7 days surrounding the announcement day. This may reflect a process of 
uncertainty reduction as information becomes progressively available, for instance as the first 
announcement is followed by others providing additional information on the goals and 
structure of the alliance. Because this finding has important implications for the interpretation 
of prior research using the event study method and for our understanding of market efficiency 
(Fama, 1991), future research could examine whether our findings regarding the stock market 
response to strategic alliances generalize to other types of corporate announcements.  
Second, we find that, surprisingly, including confounding events has no significant 
impact on estimated abnormal returns. This may indicate that strategic alliances are generally 
isolated corporate events, or that confounding events surrounding strategic alliance 
announcements tend either to be anticipated, or that they are randomly distributed with mean 
zero.  
Third, we find that event study results are remarkably robust to the use of alternative 
methodologies for modeling and estimating expected normal returns. Specifically, the length 
and type of the estimation period and the model specification of the return-generating process 
do not significantly affect estimated abnormal returns This is consistent with prior research 
that has examined the power of alternative methodologies for modeling the return-generating 
process (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985) and Dyckman, et al., 1984). Thus, alternative 
methodologies for modeling normal returns do not seem to differ significantly in their ability 
to estimate the strength of this effect. In addition, our findings strongly indicate that the 
effects of strategic alliance announcements are consistent across samples that vary in 
industrial composition. 
Finally, we find that the impact of strategic alliance announcements on firm value has 
gradually increased over time and that it is lower for firms listed on European and Japanese  
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than for firms listed on US stock exchanges. This may reflect national differences in stock 
market reactions to corporate events, or systematic differences in the characteristics of 
strategic alliances formed by European and Japanese firms compared to those formed by U.S. 
firms. Future research could explore in more detail the factors underlying this difference. 
Although this study focused on event studies examining the impact of strategic 
alliances on firm value, two factors increase our confidence in the generalizability of our 
findings to other types of corporate events. First, strategic alliances are amongst the most 
frequent modes of corporate development (McGahan and Villalonga, 2003) and are close 
substitutes to internal growth and acquisitions (Hennart and Reddy, 1997). Second, the 
methodological heterogeneity we observe in our sample is similar to that in other event 
studies, such as those of the impact of mergers and acquisitions (Halpern, 1983; King et al., 
2004). 
Our study also illustrates how meta-analysis can be used to integrate empirical 
evidence in the field of finance. Meta-analysis has emerged as crucial methodology for the 
cumulation of empirical evidence across a large number of disciplines. For instance, meta-
analysis has been used in management research to examine, amongst other issues, the link 
between the composition of the board of directors and financial performance (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) and the link between firm diversification and performance 
(Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). Meta-analysis can contribute in several ways to the 
development and testing of theories in finance. In particular, meta-analysis may be used: (a) 
to synthesize empirical evidence on the relationship between variables, (b) to investigate the 
generality and boundaries of an empirical relationship by examining sources of variability 
among study findings, and (c) to examine the influence of variables that have not been 
examined in prior research but that can be explored by contrasting different studies (Miller 
and Pollock, 2004).  
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In conclusion, the findings reported in this paper have implications for research using 
the event study method. Our results show that the length of the event window and the 
national origin of the stock exchange in which the announcing firms are listed are crucial 
elements to be considered not only when interpreting and comparing past empirical estimates 
of stock market reactions to corporate events, but also for the design of new event studies.  





DO FIRMS BENEFIT FROM ENTERING 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES? AN INTEGRATIVE 
REVIEW AND META-ANALYSIS 
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES–voluntary contractual agreements between firms to govern the 
coordination, sharing, exchange, or combination of assets, knowledge, capabilities, or 
activities–are a pervasive organizational phenomenon of central interest to organizational 
scholars and managers. Managerial interest in alliances arises from the assumption that 
strategic alliances create value for firms entering them. This is reflected in the prevalence, 
both in relative and absolute terms, of strategic alliances as modes for corporate development. 
Between 1990 and 1999 over 40,270 strategic alliances were announced involving at least 
one U.S. firm, compared to 46,766 mergers and acquisitions, 5,103 initial public offerings, 
and 454 spinoffs (Robinson, 2001). Strategic alliances seem to be even more pervasive 
among the largest U.S. firms. In a study of eighty-six Fortune 100 companies, McGahan and 
Villalonga (2003) found that, over the same period, alliances accounted for over 57 percent of 
all external corporate development activities (i.e., alliances, mergers and acquisitions, and 
divestures), with twice as many alliances being formed than mergers and acquisitions. From 
computer manufacturers to financial services, from the United States to Japan, from research 
                                                 
6 This chapter is the result of joint work with Jean-François Hennart and Tammo H.A. Bijmolt. We thank Lyda 
Bigelow for her helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the 64th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, in New Orleans. The list of studies 
included in this meta-analysis is provided in Appendix A. 
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and development to marketing, the incidence of strategic alliances as primary modes for 
organizing economic activity extends across a wide range of industries, countries, and 
activities (Barfield and Thum, 2003). 
Scholarly interest in strategic alliances has paralleled their rising importance as modes 
of corporate development. This has led to the emergence of a substantial, and growing, 
volume of theoretical and empirical research on the formation, governance, evolution and 
performance of strategic alliances (for a review, see Gulati, 1998). Of the various causes and 
consequences of strategic alliances the effect of such partnerships on the performance of 
participating firms is perhaps the most crucial since the expectation that alliances create value 
is the primary driver of alliance formation (Stuart 2000). Yet, while prior research has led to 
valuable insights on the effects of alliances on firm performance, the empirical evidence 
provides no consensus on whether or not alliances create value for participating firms and on 
the magnitude of these effects (Reuer, 2004). Indeed, while some studies have found that 
alliance announcements create firm value (e.g., Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin, 1997) 
others have shown that they destroy it (Lee and Wyatt, 1990). As Gulati noted in his review 
of the literature, “results provide mixed evidence of the beneficial consequences of alliances 
for firms entering them” (1998: 309). Given the inconsistencies in prior empirical results it is 
thus important to determine what is, on average, the impact of strategic alliances on firm 
value. 
Questions also exist about the factors which account for the variability in the value 
created by alliances. For instance, do the economic gains of alliances vary according to their 
governance structure (equity vs. non-equity) or their geographic or market scope? While a 
large number of studies have addressed these issues, empirical research has not always been 
cumulative. Prior studies have adopted a plurality of distinct theoretical perspectives (Kogut, 
1988; Reuer, 2004) and used a large number of different variables to explain the relationship  
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between strategic alliances and firm value. Indeed, our review of the empirical literature 
indicates that 90 distinct variables have been used, of which 32 have been investigated in 
three or more studies and 48 have been investigated only once. Moreover, although previous 
studies have examined the influence of a variety of factors there has been no shared 
theoretical framework for explanatory variables. Evidence has been piecemeal since studies 
investigate, on average, the influence of just five variables on the alliance-firm value link. 
Finally, for several factors for which there is cumulative evidence, such as the performance 
consequences of alliance experience, there is little consistency in findings across studies. For 
instance, while some studies have found that by accumulating alliance experience firms can 
learn to create value in strategic alliances (e.g., Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002), others did not 
(e.g., Merchant and Schendel, 2000). Thus, despite the large number of studies, the extent to 
which firms derive economic benefits from strategic alliances, and the factors that influence 
their impact on firm value have not yet been firmly established. 
The purpose of the present paper is to theoretically and empirically clarify what is 
known about the effects of individual strategic alliances on the performance of firms entering 
them by reviewing and synthesizing major theoretical perspectives and using meta-analysis to 
provide a systematic, quantitative analysis of whether and how firm value is created in 
strategic alliances. Meta-analysis provides a valuable method for integrating and interpreting 
the results of empirical studies, particularly when they are contradictory (Cooper and Hedges, 
1994). Meta-analysis transforms study findings into a common metric, which in management 
research is typically a correlation coefficient. The procedure then involves using statistical 
methods to estimate with precision the average level of an effect and to identify potential 
sources of variation in results. Our meta-analysis is based on a sample of 110 studies 
examining the performance effects of 32,596 strategic alliances.  
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Strategic alliances are formed for a variety of reasons. Firms may establish alliances 
to increase market power (e.g., Berg, Duncan, and Friedman, 1982), foster innovation (e.g., 
Rothaermel, 2001), learn or access new knowledge and capabilities (e.g., Inkpen, 2002; 
Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996), enter new domestic or international markets (e.g., 
Hennart, 1991), create real options in uncertain environments (e.g, Kogut, 1991), reduce risk 
through diversification (e.g., Reuer and Ragozzino, forthcoming), or combine similar or 
complementary assets to obtain economies of scale or scope (e.g., Hennart, 1988). 
Underlying these distinct motives is the notion that strategic alliances are created to exploit, 
in circumstances of market failure, interdependencies between assets, knowledge, 
capabilities, or activities that are controlled by different firms and can be shared at low 
marginal costs (Hennart, 1988). 
However, the identification of interdependencies between firms and the formation of 
alliances to derive value from these interdependencies only creates the potential for gains in 
firm performance. Importantly, the collaborative conditions under which these 
interdependencies are exploited can also have a significant influence on the extent to which 
the partner firms are able to fully realize this potential for value creation and effectively 
translate it into relational rents. Collaborative conditions, as defined in this paper, include the 
structural characteristics of the alliance and the characteristics of the partnering firms that 
shape the cooperative behavior of the firms in the alliance. Below we build on previous 
research to develop hypotheses on how the motives for alliance formation and the 
collaborative conditions present at the inception of the alliance influence the link between 
strategic alliances and firm value
7. Figure 3.1 presents the model for the study. 
 
                                                 
7 We limit our analysis to those variables for which there is sufficient cumulative evidence (five or more 
independent estimates) to warrant their inclusion in the meta-analysis.  
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FIGURE 3.1 
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Motives for Alliance Formation and Firm Value 
Prior research suggests that firms may form alliances in response to perceived 
interdependencies with other organizations (Gulati, 1998). Important sources of 
interdependence, emphasized in the literature on the link between strategic alliances and firm 
value, are similarity and complementarity (a) in the geographic markets and (b) product 
domains in which firms operate and (c) in the assets they own. Salient among the 
inducements to form alliances are also the goal to exploit interdependencies in terms of (d) 
excess financial resources and of (e) those firm-specific resources that are valuable, rare, 
difficult to imitate, imperfectly tradable (e.g., Barney, 1991) and that, like public goods, can 
be shared or applied to new ventures at low marginal cost (Hennart, 1988). 
Geographic expansion. International expansion into new geographical markets is a 
pervasive motive underlying alliance formation. Indeed, between 1990 and 1999 international  
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alliances represented 46 percent of all alliance announcements involving at least one U.S. 
firm (Barfield and Thum, 2003). Prior research offers two contrasting perspectives on the 
type of international expansion that is pursued in strategic alliances and its effects on firm 
value. One perspective suggests that international expansion can create value through the 
diversification of risk, that is, the stabilization of a firm’s rent stream by owning assets in 
multiple countries with unrelated economic cycles (e.g., Kim, Hwang, and Burgers, 1993). It 
predicts that international strategic alliances create more value when they are formed in host 
countries whose economies are less integrated with that of the home country, and whose 
capital markets are less developed thus creating barriers for individual investors to replicate 
the risk reduction through personal portfolio diversification (Lummer and McConnell, 1990). 
In contrast, an alternative perspective suggests that entry into foreign markets is not 
motivated by risk reduction, but instead by the opportunity to exploit firm-specific assets 
across multiple locations in conditions where the marginal costs of such exploitation are low 
and the market for these assets is imperfect (e.g., Hennart, 1988). In this view, the effects of 
alliances on firm value are a function of the marginal costs of governing the cross-border 
exploitation of idiosyncratic assets. Transaction-cost theory suggests that the value creation 
effect of strategic alliances relative to other alternative modes of international expansion such 
as acquisitions and wholly-owned greenfields is highest when firms enter countries with 
diverse social cultures and economies (e.g., Hennart, 1988). This is because cooperation with 
local partners is particularly efficient when the firm does not possess all the knowledge 
required to operate in the host country, otherwise the firm would have entered using an 
international entry mode with a higher level of control. However, because the marginal costs 
of managing cooperation increase in tandem with cultural distance (e.g., Barkema, Bell, and 
Pennings, 1996) alliances may be most effective in moderately dissimilar, rather than highly 
dissimilar, host countries. Since low cultural distance is typically associated with high  
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economic integration, and vice-versa, (e.g., Slangen, Beugelsdijk, and Hennart, 2004), this 
perspective predicts that international strategic alliances create more value when they are 
formed in host countries with moderate levels of cultural distance and whose economies are 
moderately integrated with that of the home country (Dess et al., 1995). 
Previous evidence on the linear relationship between the level of economic integration 
and cultural distance of the home and host countries and the performance effects of alliances 
has been mixed. Some studies have found a positive effect on firm value of alliances formed 
in uncorrelated economies (e.g., Ojah, Seitz, and Rawashdeh, 1997), while others have found 
a negative effect (e.g., Gupta and Misra, 2000). Similarly, whereas some studies have found a 
negative relationship between cultural distance and the value creation effects of alliances 
(e.g., Barkema and Piaskowska, 2003), others have found a positive effect (e.g., Kim and 
Park, 2004). We argue that risk diversification and asset exploitation may reflect 
complementary, rather than divergent, sources of value creation, and that economic 
integration may thus have a curvilinear relationship with firm value. Specifically, we predict 
that strategic alliances established in host countries whose economies are moderately 
integrated with that the partnering firms’ home country are likely to generate the highest 
value for the alliance partners by producing both diversification and exploitation benefits. 
Hypothesis 1a-b. The relationship between the level of (a) economic integration 
between the home and host countries and (b) cultural distance and the effects of 
strategic alliance announcements on firm value is curvilinear (inverted U-shape). 
Product-market expansion. Firms may establish alliances that expand across product-
market boundaries to benefit from the risk reduction and economies of scale or scope 
associated with leveraging firm-specific assets across a variety of product markets. Prior 
research suggests that the effects of such alliances on firm value are contingent on the degree 
of  alliance product-market relatedness, that is the level of resource or product-market  
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similarity between the parent firm and the alliance (e.g., Koh and Venkatraman, 1991). This 
is because the benefits and costs of product-market expansion may differ across different 
levels of alliance relatedness. Alliances formed in highly related markets may generate gains 
to the parent firm by creating opportunities for the firm to exploit in the alliance its firm-
specific assets and capabilities which tend to be industry-specific, increasing market power, 
and creating barriers to entry (Hennart, 1988; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976, Porter and Fuller, 
1986). In addition, since absorptive capacity is higher for proximate domains of activity 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), related alliances create more opportunities for learning through 
knowledge transfer between the parent and the alliance (Inkpen, 2000). Conversely, alliances 
formed in unrelated markets may create financial benefits in terms of risk diversification and 
increased debt capacity, but may also lead to higher management costs as a result of 
managing increasingly diverse businesses (Palich, Cardinal, and Miller, 2000). Moreover, a 
transaction-cost perspective suggests that alliances are superior to other modes of corporate 
development when firms exploit their firm-specific assets in unrelated market domains for 
which they do not possess all the required assets and capabilities to compete successfully 
(Hennart, 1988). 
There has been no theoretical and empirical consensus on whether alliances that 
operate in product-market domains which are related to those of the parent (the level of 
alliance product-market relatedness) are likely to have a positive or negative impact on firm 
value. While some studies have predicted and found a positive effect of alliance relatedness 
on firm value (e.g., Merchant, 2002), others have suggested and found a negative effect (e.g., 
Ferris, Sen, Lim, and Yeo, 2002). We argue that strategic alliances established in moderately 
related product-market domains will create more value than those established in highly 
related or highly unrelated markets. When expanding into highly related markets, firms 
generally possess all necessary resources to effectively enter the market. Accordingly,  
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internal development is generally a more efficient mode of corporate development for 
expanding into these markets and the relative value effects of strategic alliances will be lower 
(Chatterjee and Singh, 1999). In addition, expansion into related markets does not create 
diversification benefits for the partnering firms. In contrast, when expanding into highly 
unrelated markets, the partnering firm is likely to have fewer opportunities to create value by 
exploiting its existing assets. Moreover, the costs of managing a highly diverse business are 
also likely to increase significantly, limiting the potential for value creation. Alliances 
established in moderately related markets allow firms to exploit their idiosyncratic assets, 
while simultaneously acquiring new knowledge and deriving some benefits from 
diversification. Hence, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between alliance product-market relatedness and the 
performance effects of strategic alliance announcements is curvilinear (inverted U-
shape). 
Exploit resource interdependence. Strategic alliances are mechanisms for governing 
interdependence between firms, in terms of their assets, capabilities or activities (Gulati, 
1998). Prior research on strategic alliances (Hennart, 1988) suggests that firms can derive 
economic benefits from two types of resource interdependence: gains from pooling similar 
resources, and gains from pooling distinct, but complementary, resources. Resource and 
product-market similarity (relatedness) between alliance partners may facilitate 
communication, knowledge transfer and coordination, decrease transaction costs, and create 
the opportunity to achieve economies of scale in administration, production, marketing and 
R&D (Koh and Venkatraman, 1991; Merchant and Schendel, 2000). In contrast, resource and 
product-market complementarity (unrelatedness) between alliance partners may create 
opportunities for achieving economies of scope from combining products, knowledge, and 
market presence that complement and enhance one another so that their joint value is greater  
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than their separate value (e.g., Hennart, 1988). Empirical evidence on the effects of partner 
relatedness on the link between strategic alliances and firm value has been mixed, with some 
studies finding a positive relationship (e.g., Chan, Kensinger, Keown, and Martin, 1997) and 
others a negative one (e.g., Chang and Chen, 2002). Because both relatedness (similarity) and 
unrelatedness (complementarity) between the alliance partners can create value, we predict: 
Hypothesis 3a. The degree of partner relatedness will have no effect on the link 
between strategic alliance announcements and firm value. 
Strategic alliances are generally formed to govern resource interdependence between 
the partnering firms in three distinct functional domains: marketing, production, or research 
and development. Prior research suggests that the effects of alliances on firm value may vary 
between these different domains of interdependence, with R&D alliances creating more long-
term value than production or marketing alliances (Chan et al., 1997; Das, Sen, and Sengupta, 
1998). Das, Sen, and Sengupta (1998) suggest that this is because R&D alliances are 
typically associated with the combination of firm-specific, often tacit, knowledge and the 
development of new resources, products, and capabilities which are likely to generate new 
sources of rents and growth opportunities for the participating firms and that, as a result, have 
a long-term impact on performance. In contrast, product and marketing alliances are 
associated with the exploitation, rather than the exploration, of existing assets and capabilities 
and are therefore less likely to generate growth options that have a positive impact on long-
term firm performance. However, although R&D alliances may generate more value by 
increasing a firm’s portfolio of resources as well as creating new strategic options, their 
outcomes are considerably more uncertain that those of production or marketing alliances 
which leverage existing assets. Thus, given the higher certainty associated with we the impact 
of production and marketing alliances we predict that they should, on average, create more 
firm value. Thus, we propose:  
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Hypothesis 3b. The effects of marketing and production alliance announcements on 
firm value are greater than those of R&D alliances. 
Exploit competitive interdependence. In addition to resource interdependence, 
alliance formation may also exploit competitive interdependence between the participating 
firms to obtain gains from collusion ( Kogut, 1988; Pfeffer andNowak, 1976) by influencing 
the volume, price or attributes of products sold in an industry. Research suggests that the anti-
competitive effects of strategic alliances, and hence their influence on firm performance, are 
likely to increase as a function of the level of industry concentration (e.g., Zantout, 1995). 
Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 4. The concentration ratio of the alliance’s industry has a positive effect 
on the impact of strategic alliance announcements on firm value. 
Exploit firm-specific assets.  Transaction-cost (e.g., Hennart, 1988) and resource-
based (e.g., Penrose 1959) perspectives emphasize the exploitation of firm-specific assets as a 
primary motive underlying expansion decisions, especially for those assets that the firm owns 
in excess and that can be exploited at low marginal costs but, due to market imperfections, 
cannot be sold. By their nature, intangible assets such as reputation and know-how typically 
possess both characteristics (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Teece, 1980). Thus, the presence of 
intangible assets is likely to create opportunities for exploiting interdependencies between the 
partnering firms that derive economic value from economies of scope in the exploitation of 
intangible assets. Hence, 
Hypothesis 5. The level of intangible assets of the partnering firms has a positive 
impact on the effects of strategic alliance announcements on firm value. 
Exploit excess financial resources. Agency theory suggests that alliance formation 
may not always occur in response to opportunities to increase firm performance, but may 
sometimes be motivated by managerial self-interest (Jensen, 1986). Specifically, by forming  
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strategic alliances to increase firm size and reduce risk through diversification managers may 
increase their power and compensation as well as reduce their employment risk (Wild, 1994) 
irrespective of the strategic alliance’s economic effects. Prior research suggests that the 
availability and sources of firms’ financial resources influences managerial discretion, with 
discretion increasing when investments are financed with free cash flow (cash flow exceeding 
that required to fund all current positive net value investments), and decreasing when they are 
funded through external financing (Jensen, 1986; Smith and Watts, 1992; Williamson, 1988). 
Bourgeois (1981) has suggested that the relationship between financial resources and firm 
performance may be curvilinear. This is because, although possessing excess financial 
resources may have deleterious effects, having access to a critical level of financial resources 
may also allow firms to respond quickly to strategic opportunities and temporarily buffer 
firms from external threats. Consistent with this view we propose that moderate levels of free 
cash-flow will increase the impact of strategic alliances on firm value by allowing firms to 
react efficiently to potential interdependencies with other firms, while simultaneously 
limiting managerial discretion. In addition, because external financing, measured by the 
firms’ financial leverage (the ratio of long-term debt to market value), is constrained by loan 
covenants we expect that external financing will provide the required resources to finance the 
development of strategic alliances, while simultaneously limiting managerial discretion. 
Thus, we predict: 
Hypotheses 6a. The relationship between a firm’s level of free cash flow and the 
effects of strategic alliance announcements on firm value is curvilinear (inverted U-
shape). 
Hypothesis 6b. The level of financial leverage of the partnering firms has a positive 
impact on the effects of strategic alliance announcements on firm value.  
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Collaborative Conditions and Firm Value 
Strategic alliances differ considerably, not only in the motives underlying alliance 
formation and the type of interorganizational interdependencies that they exploit but, 
importantly, in the capabilities and resources of the partnering firms, and the structural 
attributes of the alliances themselves. Prior research suggests that these collaborative 
conditions may have an important bearing on the extent to which the potential for value 
creation arising from the exploitation of interdependencies is fully realized (e.g., Merchant 
and Schendel 2000). In the present research we explore two types of collaborative conditions 
that may shape the degree of cooperation between the two partners and the ability to generate 
relational rents. These include the governance and relational structure of the alliance and the 
learning processes that take place at the level of the partnering firms (see Figure 3.1). 
Governance structure of the alliance.  Coordinating, exchanging, and combining 
assets, knowledge, and activities in strategic alliances, although potentially valuable, can also 
entail substantial costs and risks for the firms entering them. These risks, which can increase 
transaction costs and reduce cooperation between the alliance partners, may arise as a result 
of asymmetrical dependence between the partnering firms, difficulty in monitoring each 
partner’s assets and contribution, and appropriation concerns regarding unwanted spillovers 
of firm-specific assets and knowledge to the alliance partners (Hennart, 1988). Transaction 
cost theory (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1985) suggests that the incidence of these hazards is 
contingent on the contractual structure governing the alliance. In other words, it postulates 
that firms can minimize the potential hazards from cooperation and the accompanying 
transaction costs by choosing a governance structure for the alliance that maximizes the 
partners’ joint incentive to cooperate and minimizes their incentives to behave 
opportunistically. Thus, the extent to which the governance structure chosen for the alliance 
offsets the potential risks inherent to collaboration is likely to determine the degree of  
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cooperation between the alliance partners and the economic value they derive from the 
alliance. Specifically, research has shown that hierarchy-based organizational mechanisms 
(equity alliances) become more effective than market-based organizational mechanisms (non-
equity alliances) as appropriation concerns and opportunism increase (e.g., Hennart, 1991). 
Given that appropriation concerns and risks of opportunism are particularly high for 
intangible assets and idiosyncratic knowledge (Hennart, 1988), we predict: 
Hypothesis 7a-b. The effects of the announcement of (a) R&D alliances and (b) 
alliances that exploit the intangible assets of the partnering firms on firm value are 
higher for equity alliances than for non-equity alliances. 
However, a transaction cost perspective also postulates that firms typically select the 
optimal governance mode given the characteristics of the alliance and that, as a result, mode 
choice should, on average, have no effect on firm performance (McGahan and Villalonga, 
2003). Hence, 
Hypothesis 7c. The governance structure of a strategic alliance (equity vs. non-
equity) has no effect on firm value. 
While all equity alliances share a common incentive structure that differs 
fundamentally from non-equity alliances, there is substantial heterogeneity in how equity 
ownership is distributed between the partner firms. Prior research suggests that the 
performance benefits a firm derives from alliance formation, may be contingent on its 
ownership share of the alliance (e.g., Merchant and Schendel, 2000). In particular, a parent 
firm’s ownership share in the alliance influences its incentives and power to control the 
alliance’s strategy and activities, with majority equity ownership guaranteeing that the 
interests of the majority parent will be served by the equity alliance (e.g., Merchant and 
Schendel, 2000; Park and Kim, 1997). However, while the majority partner has both a higher 
incentive and greater power to influence the strategy of the equity alliance, the minority  
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partner will also have lower incentives to cooperate (e.g., Hennart, 1988). Hence the majority 
partner will have to invest more resources in monitoring the minority partner because the 
majority partner will suffer more if the venture goes badly. For the majority partner, the 
higher potential gains are therefore balanced by the higher potential costs it will shoulder 
should the minority partner shirk. Hence, we predict: 
Hypothesis 7d. A partnering firm’s level of equity ownership in a strategic alliance 
has no effect on firm value. 
Relational structure of the alliance. The cooperative behavior of the alliance partners 
is shaped not only by the governance structure of the alliance but also by its relational 
structure (e.g., Gulati, 1995). Indeed, prior research has shown that the degree of similarity in 
the dominant logics of the partnering firms (Bettis and Prahalad, 1995) and in the norms and 
routines regulating partners’ cooperative behavior can have an important influence on the 
impact of alliances on firm value (e.g., Merchant and Schendel, 2000; Park and Kim, 1997). 
This is because similarity between the organizational goals and structures of the alliance 
partners is likely to be associated with compatible dominant logics and this will, in turn, 
facilitate the development of more efficient coordination and communication processes in the 
alliance (e.g., Lyles and Salk, 1996). Our review indicates that extant research has mostly 
examined two elements of the relational structure: whether the alliance is established with a 
foreign for-profit firm or instead with a foreign state-owned enterprise and the history of prior 
ties between the alliance partners. Research has shown, for instance, that because state-owned 
enterprises often possess different goals and decision-making processes than private or public 
firms, a for-profit firm establishing an alliance with a state-owned enterprise may experience 
higher coordination costs and a lower impact of alliance formation on firm value (Lummer 
and McConnel, 1990). Hence, because prior research has focused on the impact of alliance 
announcements on the value of for-profit firms, we predict:  
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Hypothesis 8a. The effects of alliance announcements on firm value are higher for 
alliances between for-profit firms than for alliances between for-profit firms and 
state-owned enterprises. 
In addition, Gulati and Wang (2003) have suggested that the repeated formation of 
alliances between partnering firms is generally associated with the presence of trust between 
them and leads to the development of interorganizational routines for joint decision-making 
and coordination which, in turn, may generate economic value by reducing transaction costs, 
facilitating monitoring, promoting learning and knowledge transfer, and reducing 
opportunism. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypotheses 8b. The larger the number of prior ties between the partners, the higher 
the positive impact of alliance announcements on firm value. 
Organizational learning. Research on organizational learning has documented gains 
in performance stemming from accumulation of experience in performing an activity. This 
phenomenon has been observed in the context of learning by repetition in manufacturing 
(e.g., Yelle, 1979), and the development of organizational routines associated with the 
execution of complex organizational activities, such as the management of acquisitions (e.g., 
Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999) and strategic alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Thus, the 
accumulation of experience in forming and managing alliances should promote learning and 
the development of more effective routines for the formation and management of strategic 
alliances. However, research also suggests that persistent exploitation of an organizational 
routine may lead to the crystallization of knowledge in the form of a simplified, narrow and 
rigid knowledge base (Miller, 1993; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). This increasing 
simplification may, in turn, lead firms to inappropriately generalize their prior alliance 
experience to strategic alliances where this experience is not appropriate (cf. Haleblian and 
Finkelstein, 1999). This inability to adapt alliance management practices to the idiosyncratic  
  57
set of opportunities and threats related to forming or managing a particular alliance may have 
adverse effects on firm value. Hence, 
Hypothesis 9a. The relationship between the alliance experience of the partnering 
firms and the effects of strategic alliance announcements on firm value is curvilinear 
(inverted U-shape). 
Moreover, the development of alliance capabilities is likely to allow firms to manage 
more effectively the relational aspects of the alliance. Hence, 
Hypothesis 9b-c. The partnering firms’ level of alliance experience moderates the link 
between (b) cultural distance and (c) the type of alliance partner (for-profit firm vs. 
state-owned enterprise) on the effects of strategic alliance announcements on firm 
value.  
Experience with a host country or geographic region has also been found to lead to 
the accumulation of knowledge and development of routines for interacting with the 
country’s institutional and cultural environment (e.g., Barkema, Bell, and Pennings, 1996). 
However, because these attributes tend to be relatively stable over time, the crystallization of 
routines may not have negative performance effects. We therefore hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 9d. The relationship between the country experience of the partnering 
firms and the effects of strategic alliance announcements on firm value is positive. 
Research also suggests that the effects of learning on performance may differ across 
different types of alliances (Anand and Khanna, 2000). In a study of stock market reactions to 
strategic alliance announcements, Anand and Khanna (2000) proposed that the value of 
learning is contingent on the level of contractual ambiguity characteristic of a particular type 
of alliance, with experience being more valuable in ambiguous contexts. Consistent with their 
predictions, they found that in joint ventures, which are characterized by greater ambiguity, 
the accumulation of experience increased the partnering firms’ ability to create value,  
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whereas in licensing, where the collaborative process is more codified, experience 
accumulation did not impact subsequent value creation. Building on this perspective, we 
argue that the effects of alliance experience and country experience may differ between 
equity and non-equity alliances. Specifically, we predict that experiential learning will be 
more valuable for the management of equity alliances that typically have a less defined 
contractual structure and instead rely on the ex post distribution of residual profits to promote 
cooperation, than for non-equity alliances that are generally characterized by more codified 
and detailed contractual stipulations 
Moreover, since forming an international joint venture involves the establishment of a 
new firm and requires a high level of interaction with the host country’s political and legal 
environment, the value of country experience should be higher for equity than non-equity 
international alliances. Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 9e-f. The value creation effects of (e) alliance experience and (f) country 
experience are higher for announcements of equity than for those of non-equity 
alliances. 
METHODS 
We conducted two distinct, but complementary, meta-analyses. The first meta-
analysis explores the effects of alliance announcements on firm value. The second meta-
analysis cumulates the empirical evidence on the factors that influence the impact of strategic 
alliances on firm value. Together, they allow us to establish firm generalizations on whether 
and when firms benefit from entering strategic alliances. The two meta-analyses were 
conducted according to the guidelines provided by Hegdes and Olkin (1985). 
Sample 
We combined multiple data collection strategies to identify published and 
unpublished empirical studies that provided estimates of the impact of strategic alliances on  
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firm value. We limited our search to studies that employed the event study method, since this 
has been the prevalent methodology to estimate the effects of individual alliances on firm 
value (Gulati, 1998). In event studies, the financial effects of a corporate event on firm value, 
termed abnormal returns, are measured as the difference between the observed event-day 
returns on a security and the estimated returns that would be expected in the absence of the 
event. Prior research on strategic alliances has provided support for the predictive validity of 
abnormal returns as indicators of the impact of strategic alliances on firm performance. For 
instance, Koh and Venkatraman (1991) and Kale, Dyer, and Singh (2002) have found that 
managers’ evaluation of the performance effects of strategic alliances in the years following 
alliance formation was significantly correlated with the abnormal returns estimated at the 
time of the alliance announcement. 
First, articles were identified through a bibliographic search of computerized 
databases. ABI/Inform Global, EconLit, JSTOR, Kluwer Online, Elsevier Science Direct, and 
the Social Science Citation Index were searched using the terms ‘joint venture(s)’, ‘strategic 
alliance(s)’, ‘performance’, ‘event study’, ‘shareholder value’, ‘abnormal return(s)’, ‘wealth 
effect(s)’, ‘residual(s)’, ‘prediction error’, ‘excess return(s)’, and ‘firm value’. Second, we 
performed manual searches (over the 1980 to 2004 period) of relevant journals in finance, 
accounting, management, and marketing, including: Academy of Management Journal, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Journal of International Business Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Marketing, 
Journal of Marketing Research, and Strategic Management Journal. Third, we performed 
Internet searches using standard search engines. Finally, we examined the reference sections 
of all the articles retrieved and of prior narrative reviews of the strategic alliance literature 
(e.g., Gulati, 1998). 
Studies were considered eligible for the meta-analysis if they reported on the effects  
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of strategic alliance announcements on firm value, measured in abnormal returns. In addition, 
to be included in our database, the study had to be based on daily returns. This search process 
yielded 110 empirical studies (including 30 unpublished papers) from which we obtained 554 
estimates of the impact of strategic alliances announcements on firm value and 296 estimates 
(bivariate correlations) of the effects of factors associated with the motives for alliance 
formation and the collaborative conditions present at the inception of the alliance on the link 
between alliance formation and firm value. Because some studies provided information on 
more than one independent sample, our analysis is based on 140 independent samples with a 
total sample size of 32,596 strategic alliances announced between 1963 and 2001. Two 
judges independently coded each study. The overall level of interrater reliability for coding 
decisions was 97%. Inconsistencies were resolved through discussion. 
Meta-Analytic Procedures 
Effects of strategic alliances on firm value. For the meta-analysis of the effects of 
alliance announcements on firm value two judges independently coded for each study the 
sample size and the reported abnormal returns for the partnering firms over eight distinct 
event windows ranging from the day of the strategic alliance announcement (day 0) to a 21-
day window surrounding the announcement day. We also coded potential substantive and 
methodological moderators, including the strategic alliance characteristics and the length of 
the event window used to estimate the abnormal returns associated with strategic alliance 
announcements. The variables characterizing the strategic alliances were the (a) mode of 
governance: equity vs. non-equity alliances; the (b) industry sector: the percentage of 
strategic alliances in manufacturing industries (cf. Huber, Miller, and Glick, 1990); the (c) 
geographic scope of the strategic alliances: national origin of the partnering firms and 
whether the alliance is domestic or international (domestic alliances formed between U.S. 
firms; international alliances involving at least one U.S. firm; domestic alliances formed  
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between firms located outside the U.S.; international alliances involving at least one non-U.S. 
firm); and (d) the mean year of alliance formation. Finally, we test for the presence of 
publication bias by coding the publication status of the study (published vs. unpublished). 
Publication bias is present if the probability that a study is published is contingent on the 
magnitude, direction or significance of its results (Begg, 1994).  
To investigate the influence of strategic alliance characteristics and the length of the 
event window on the magnitude of estimated abnormal returns, we separately modeled the 
abnormal returns obtained for event window l in study k (ARlk) as a function of a alliance 
characteristics, denoted as Xj,lk (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). In order to obtain accurate 
estimates of the effects of alliance characteristics on firm value, we need to account for 
within-study dependency between the abnormal returns estimated for different event 
windows. Hierarchical linear models, also termed multilevel models, provide a statistical 
method for directly modeling the dependency between multiple estimates of abnormal returns 
obtained from the same study (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Hierarchical linear models are 
random-coefficient regression models for analyzing nested data structures such as the 
presence of multiple event windows within the same study. In addition, because effect sizes 
based on larger samples contain less sampling error, we use the sample size as a weight in our 
analysis (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). In particular, we estimated the following weighted 
hierarchical linear model (Bijmolt and Pieters, 2001):  
  k lk
J
j
lk j j lk u e X AR + + + = ∑
=1
, 0 β β  (2) 
where we assume that the within-study error components elk, and the between-study 
error components uk are normally distributed with zero mean and variances ς
2 and τ
2, 
respectively. Prior to estimating the hierarchical linear model we examined potential 
collinearity between the measures capturing the strategic alliance characteristics and the 
length of the event window. Examination of variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics  
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indicated a low level of collinearity with no important effects for model estimation 
(maximum VIF = 3.22). This result suggests that there is little co-variation among distinct 
alliance characteristics, indicating that the meta-analysis encompasses a wide range of 
strategic alliances and research settings. 
Determinants of the effects of alliances on firm value. For the meta-analysis 
examining the determinants of the link between strategic alliances and firm value, we coded 
the sample size and the correlations between the predictor variables and the impact of alliance 
announcements on firm value measured in abnormal returns. The construct 
operationalizations reported in the original studies were used to classify all correlations. All 
relationships in this analysis include data from at least five independent samples (mean = 12 
samples), with an average sample size per relationship of 2,418 strategic alliances (range = 
1,020–5,749). For studies that did not provide correlations, reported statistics (Student’s t, 
univariate F ratios, exact p-values) were converted to correlation coefficients by means of 
formulas provided by Rosenthal (1994). For each correlation, we used the sample-adjusted 
meta-analytic deviancy statistic developed by Huffcutt and Arthur (1995) to identify the 
presence of outlying observations. No outliers were identified. Correlations were individually 
corrected for artificial dichotomization of continuous independent variables and for range 
restriction in independent dichotomous variables (Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). This is because 
the dichotomization of variables that represent underlying continuous constructs artificially 
reduces the magnitude of the observed correlation by approximately 20 percent (Cohen, 
1983). Given that for the same determinant of the link between strategic alliances and firm 
performance, studies varied in the extent to which continuous variables were or not 
dichotomized, these corrections are required to make effect sizes comparable across studies. 
Following the meta-analytic procedures described by Hedges and Olkin (1985), we 
computed a pooled correlation coefficient for each determinant of the effect of strategic  
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alliances on firm performance. Specifically, we (1) transformed each observed correlation to 
Fisher’s  Z in order to avoid the slight bias associated with averaging correlations, (2) 
weighted the observed Z-values by the sample size of the study, and (3) computed the mean 
weighted correlation by back-transforming the average Z-value into a correlation coefficient. 
We also estimated 95 percent confidence intervals around the mean weighted correlations and 
conducted homogeneity analyses based on the Q statistic (Hedges and Olkin, 1985) to 
evaluate the extent to which the estimated correlations were drawn from the same population. 
Curvilinear relationships imply that the magnitude and/or direction of the correlation 
between an independent variable and the impact of alliances on firm value is contingent on 
the value of the independent variable. Therefore, to test the hypothesized curvilinear 
relationships the mean values of the independent variable for each study were used as 
predictors in weighted regression analyses in which sample size was used as a weight 
(Hedges and Olkin, 1985). For instance, to test whether the relationship between a firm’s 
alliance experience and the performance effects of alliances was curvilinear, we regressed the 
correlation between alliance experience and firm performance onto the mean value of alliance 
experience for each study and its quadratic term. To test the predicted curvilinear effects we 
coded for each relevant study the mean values of: (a) alliance experience, (b) partner 
relatedness; (c) alliance relatedness; (d) the host country’s level of economic development; 
(e) the host country’s level of capital market development; and (f) the level of free cash flow 
of the partnering firms. 
RESULTS 
Do Firms Benefit from Entering Strategic Alliances? 
Table 3.1 provides meta-analytic results of the effects of strategic alliances on firm 
value based on 110 empirical studies and reflecting a total sample size of 32,596 strategic 
alliances. We first estimated a random-effects model that includes only an intercept term  
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(Model 1). This model provides a baseline against which to compare more complex models. 
Our findings indicate that the variance at the within-study level is 39.20 and that at the 
between study-level is 1.28. This corresponds to an intra-study correlation of 0.97, indicating 
that, as expected, abnormal returns obtained from the same study are highly correlated and, 
therefore, that a hierarchical linear model should be estimated to account for this dependency. 
In Model 2 we examine the impact of strategic alliances on firm value for different 
event windows of varying length. The results show that strategic alliances have, on average, a 
positive effect on firm value. For instance, at the time the alliance is announced (day 0) the 
meta-analytic estimate of the mean abnormal return for the participating firms is 0.46 percent. 
This means that by announcing a strategic alliance the stock market capitalization of a firm 
increases by 0.46 percent. Significantly, the performance effects of strategic alliances are not 
only positive, but they are also considerably larger than the gains obtained by bidders in 
merger and acquisitions. In a meta-analysis of the factors influencing value creation in 
mergers and acquisitions, Datta, Pinches and Narayanan (1992) found that abnormal returns 
over a 21-day window were 0.39 percent for bidders. In contrast, our findings show that, over 
an equivalent 21-day window, the abnormal returns for firms participating in strategic 
alliances are 1.11 percent, (obtained by summing the event-day abnormal return of 0.46 
percent with the 0.65 increase in abnormal returns associated with a 21-day event window). 
Model 3 shows the impact of strategic alliance characteristics on the link between 
alliance announcements and firm value. To evaluate model fit we compare the deviance of 
the full model (-2 times the log-likelihood) with the deviance of a baseline, random-effects, 
model that includes only an intercept term (Model 1). The deviance statistics of the full 
model (1309.3) compares favorably with the baseline random-effects model (1231.7) 
indicating an increase in model fit (χ
2(17) = 77.6, p < 0.001). 
Following transaction cost theory, Hypothesis 7c predicts that, on average, the  
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governance structure of the alliance (equity vs. non-equity) has no effect on its performance 
and hence on firm value. This is because firms are expected to choose whatever governance 
structure is optimal. Consistent with this prediction, our results indicate that announcements 
of equity alliances have the same impact on firm value than those of non equity alliances (B = 
-.30, p > .20). Thus, Hypothesis 7c cannot be rejected. 
TABLE 3.1 
Results Weighted of Hierarchical Linear Regression for Abnormal Returns
a 
 Model 
Variables 1  2  3 
Geographic Scope
b      
 U.S.–International      -.09
c 
 Non-U.S.–Domestic      -.82
 c,d 
 Non-U.S.–International      -.72
 *** d 
Equity Alliances      -.30 
Alliances in Manufacturing      -.44 
Year of data collection       
 1980-1984      -.08 
 1985-1989      .21 
 1990-1994      .33 
 1995-2000      .70 
Event Window       
 (-1,0)    .27
 *** .27
 *** 
 (0,1)    .22
 *** .22
 *** 
 (-1,1)    .45
 *** .45
 *** 
 (-2,2)    .46
 *** .46
 *** 
 (-3,3)    .52
 *** .54
 *** 
 (-5,5)    .51
 *** .51
 *** 
 (-10,10)    .65
 *** .65
 *** 





        












a n = 554. Cell entries are unstandardized coefficient estimates. 
b U.S.–Domestic: all alliance partners are U.S firms; U.S.–International: alliances involving at 
least one U.S. firm and a non-U.S. partner; Non-U.S.–Domestic: all alliance partners are non-
U.S. firms from the same nationality; Non-U.S.–International: alliance partners are non-U.S. 
firms from different nationalities. 
c,d Values sharing a superscript are not significantly different at the 5 percent level. 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
*** p < .01  
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Model 3 also tests the effect of additional alliance characteristics on their impact on 
firm value, including the country where the partnering firm is listed, time of formation, and 
industry of the strategic alliance. First, our results show that the country where the partnering 
firm is listed (U.S. vs. non-U.S. stock markets) influences its effects on firm value. In 
particular, statistical tests of equality between the regression coefficients (Verbeek, 2000) 
show that international alliances formed by non-U.S. firms create less value for the partnering 
firms in their home (non-U.S.) stock markets, than the value created in the U.S. stock market 
by international (B = -.63, p < .001) and domestic (B = -.72, p < .01) alliances formed by U.S. 
firms. This finding may reflect national differences in stock market reactions to strategic 
alliances, systematic differences in the type of strategic alliances formed by non-U.S. firms 
relative to U.S. firms, or the greater efficiency of US firms in managing alliances. Second, 
our findings indicate that estimated abnormal returns tend to be consistent across different 
time periods, suggesting that the response of market participants to strategic alliance 
announcements has been relatively stable over time, and that it has been fairly independent of 
overall market and economic conditions. Third, we find that the industry composition of the 
sample has no significant effect on estimated abnormal returns (B = -.44, p > .25). This 
indicates that the performance effects of alliances are fairly stable across manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries. Finally, we examined the presence of a publication bias by 
investigating whether there are systematic differences in abnormal returns between published 
and unpublished studies. Our results show that this is not the case (B = -.31, p > .20), 
suggesting absence of a publication bias. 
Determinants of the Alliance-Firm Value Link 
In this section, we report the meta-analytic results for 14 determinants of the link 
between strategic alliances and firm value. These results are estimated on the basis of 83 
independent samples from 78 articles examining the impact of 15,439 strategic alliances on  
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firm value. Table 3.2 reports, for each determinant, the sample-size weighted mean 
correlation coefficient (ρ), the total sample size for each correlation (N), the number of 
correlations from independent samples (k), the 95 percent confidence interval around each 
correlation mean (CIρ 5%, CIρ 95%), and the test of homogeneity in effect sizes which 
indicates the presence of moderating variables (Q). Correlations are concluded to be 
significant when the 95% confidence interval does not contain zero. Table 3.3 reports the 
results of the moderator analyses. For each moderator analysis of a determinant of the link 
between strategic alliances and firm value, Table 3.3 reports the standardized regression 
coefficients and R
2 of the weighted regression analyses, a test of the heterogeneity that 
remains after controlling for the hypothesized moderators (Q residual), the total sample size 
for each correlation (N), and the number of correlations from independent samples used in the 
moderator analyses (k). Table 3.3 also reports results for the hypothesized curvilinear 
relationships where each correlation is regressed on a linear and on a quadratic term of the 
mean value of the predictor variable for each study. 
Motives for alliance formation and firm performance. Table 3.2 provides the 
results of separate meta-analyses of the impact of distinct motives for alliance formation on 
firm performance. Hypothesis 1a predicted that the level of economic integration between the 
economies of the home country of the partnering firms and the alliance’s host country had an 
inverted U-shaped relationship with firm performance. Prior research has employed two 
distinct operationalizations of economic integration: the level of economic development of 
the host country and the level of development of the host country’s capital market. Because 
all studies included in the meta-analysis of the impact of economic integration on the effects 
of strategic alliances on firm value examined firms from developed countries, higher levels of 




Meta-Analytic Results for the Determinants of the Effects of Strategic Alliances on Firm 
Value
a 
Variables  k N  ρ CIρ 5%  CIρ 95%  Q 
Motives for Alliance Formation 
Level of economic integration   19  3,325  .041
* -.001  .082  47.202
***
Alliance relatedness   13  2,518  .121
*** .076 .164 43.214
***
Partner relatedness   17  3,524  .021  -.021  .064  45.017
***
R&D alliances   19  4,007  .074
*** .036 .111 69.429
***
Industry concentration    5  1,020  .058
* -.008  .124  17.424
***
Intangible assets   21  3,202  .154
*** .116 .192 57.280
***
Free Cash Flow   13  2,221  -.032  -.077  .013  37.277
***
Financial leverage   13  1,635  -.026  -.076  .024  51.086
***
Collaborative Conditions 
Equity share in the alliance    9  1,186  .065
** .001  .127  16.093
** 
Cultural distance    6  1,142  .020   -.038  .078  10.356
* 
Alliance with foreign state-
owned firm 
 5  1,203  -.102
** -.182  -.020  4.304 
Prior ties    7  1,581  .057
* -.002  .116  6.530 
Alliance experience   17  5,749  .004  -.023  .031  41.653
***
Country experience   11  1,542  .088
*** .025 .150 33.279
***
a k = number of correlations from independent studies; N = total sample size; ρ = estimate of 
population correlation; CIρ 5% = lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for ρ; CIρ 95% 
= upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for ρ; Q = chi-square test for heterogeneity.  
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
** p < .01 
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TABLE 3.3 















N  k 
Motives for Alliance Formation 
Level of economic 
integration 
       -.58
*** -.43
*** .36
*** 18.63   3,325 19 




*** 2,518 13 
Partner relatedness  -.33
* -.75
*** .31
*       .34
*** 29.50
*** 3,524 17 
R&D alliances  .39
***           .15
*** 60.15
***   4,007 19 
Industry 
concentration 
   -.70
***       .49
*** 8.24
**   1,020   5 
Intangible assets  -.07            .01  48.30
***   3,202 21 
Free cash flow          .22  .22  .45
*** 20.61
**   2,221 13 
Financial leverage  .39
*** -.13  .67
***       .33
*** 34.46
*** 1,635 13 
Collaborative Conditions 
Equity share in the 
alliance 
 -.51
* -.10       .32
** 10.93
*   1,186   9 
Cultural distance        -.73
** -.64 .10  .79
** 2.12   1,142   6 
Alliance experience  .32
**       -.71  1.07
** .42
*** 24.33
**   5,749 17 
Country experience  .54
***           .29
*** 23.73
***   1,501 11 
a All predictor variables are mean-centered. Cell entries are standardized coefficient estimates. Linear term = linear component of the 
relationship between the mean level of the predictor variable and the correlation between the predictor variable and the performance effects of 
strategic alliances; Quadratic term = quadratic component of the relationship between the mean level of the predictor variable and the 
correlation between the predictor variable and the performance effects of strategic alliances; k = number of correlations from independent 
studies; N = total sample size; Q residual = chi-square test for heterogeneity for regression residuals. 
* p < .10 
** p < .05 
** p < .01 
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To test whether the type of measure of economic integration used influenced the 
results we classified the studies according to how economic integration was operationalized. 
Results from a weighted regression analysis show that the magnitude of the effects did not 
depend on the type of measure used (β = .17, n.s.). 
Table 3.2 shows that the level of economic integration between the home and host 
countries has a small, marginally significant impact on the consequences of strategic alliances 
for firm value (ρ = .04, p  < .06). The significant Q-statistic indicates the presence of 
moderators. Consistent with hypothesis 1a, results from Table 3.3 show that the host 
country’s level of economic integration with the home country of the partnering firm has an 
inverted U-shaped impact on the effects of strategic alliances on firm value (βEconomic development 
squared = -.43, p < .01). Thus, international strategic alliances create more value when they are 
established in a country that is moderately integrated with the home country of the partnering 
firm. 
According to Hypothesis 1b, the level of cultural distance between the partnering 
firms also has a curvilinear effect (inverted U-shape) on the alliance-firm value link. The 
results reported in Table 3.3 provide no support for the hypothesized relationship (βCultural 
distance squared = .10, n.s.). The results of Table 3.2 also show no evidence of a significant effect 
of cultural distance on the impact of strategic alliances on firm value (ρ = .02, n.s.), but 
suggest instead that this relationship is heterogeneous. Below we investigate the hypothesized 
role of alliance experience as a potential moderator of this effect. 
Hypothesis 2 proposes an inverted U-shaped relationship between the extent to which 
the alliance operates in a product-market domain which is related to that of the parent firm 
(alliance product-market relatedness) and firm value. Lending support for Hypothesis 2, the 
results of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that, although alliance relatedness has a linear positive 
effect on firm performance (ρ = .12, p < .01) this effect is not homogeneous but follows,  
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instead an inverted U-shaped curve (βAlliance relatedness squared = -.62, p < .01). 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b focus on the impact of resource interdependence on the link 
between alliances and firm value. Our findings, reported in Table 3.2, show that the extent to 
which the partners are active in similar industries (partner relatedness) has no significant 
effect on the impact of strategic alliances on firm value (ρ = .02, n.s.). Thus, Hypothesis 3a 
cannot be rejected. This suggests that firms may derive value from combining similar or 
complementary resources with their partners. The Q-statistic indicates, however, that this 
effect is heterogeneous. We investigated potential sources of heterogeneity in this 
relationship by conducting a weighted regression analysis with the governance structure 
(equity vs. non-equity), geographic scope (domestic vs. international) and industry sector 
(manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing) of the alliance as moderators. We focused on these 
variables as they are available for all independent samples in our dataset and reflect important 
contingencies in the formation and management of strategic alliances (e.g. Erramilli, 1991; 
Hennart, 1988). 
Our results, reported in Table 3.3, show that firms which are entering alliances with 
similar partners create less firm value if they enter international alliances than if they enter 
domestic alliances (β = -.75, p < .01). This result suggests that firms are less successful in 
combining similar resources and activities in international alliances than in domestic alliances 
and may be due to at least two factors. First, related partners are likely to have higher 
absorptive capacity than unrelated ones and may therefore use the alliance to appropriate 
knowledge from each other in order to exploit it outside the scope of alliance. Second, related 
partners also have more opportunities to free ride on each other’s reputation or brand image. 
These potential hazards are likely to be more prevalent in international alliances because (a) 
monitoring costs are higher in these alliances and thus opportunism is more likely to remain 
unchecked; (b) intellectual property protection is likely to be weaker abroad than it is in the  
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US; (c) mechanisms for effective retaliation against opportunistic behavior may be less 
efficient in international alliances relative to domestic alliances as a result of cultural 
distance, geographic distance and institutional differences between the home and host 
countries. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 3b we found that R&D alliances create more value than 
production and marketing alliances (ρ = .07, p < .01), but that this effect is heterogeneous. 
This suggests that shareholders value more positively the uncertain gains from developing 
new sources of value creation than the exploitation of existing resources. Results from Table 
3.3 show that this heterogeneity is moderated by the governance structure (equity vs. non-
equity) of the strategic alliance (β = .39, p < .01) with equity R&D alliances creating more 
value than non-equity R&D alliances. Hence Hypothesis 7a is supported. 
According to Hypothesis 4 strategic alliances formed in highly concentrated industries 
allow partnering firms to create value by increasing their market power. This hypothesis was 
only marginally supported (ρ = .06, p < .09), with the Q-statistic indicating significant 
heterogeneity in this effect. To account for this heterogeneity, we tested whether the effect of 
industry concentration varies as a function of the industry sector in which the alliances were 
formed. Results from Table 3.3 suggest that is does, with alliance formation in concentrated 
manufacturing industries creating significantly less value than alliance formation in 
concentrated non-manufacturing industries (β = -.70, p < .01). 
Hypothesis 5 suggests that ownership of intangible assets provides opportunities for 
the partnering firms to create value in strategic alliances. Hypothesis 7b predicts that this 
effect will be contingent on the governance structure of the alliance, with equity alliances 
providing more effective mechanisms for minimizing opportunism. Consistent with 
Hypothesis 5 but not with Hypothesis 7b, results from Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show that the level 
of intangible assets owned by the partnering firms has a positive effect on the impact of  
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alliances on firm value (ρ = .15, p < .01), and that this effect is not influenced by the 
governance structure of the alliance (β = -.07, n.s.). 
Hypothesis 6a predicts a curvilinear relationship between the partnering firm’s level 
of free cash flow and the effects of strategic alliances on firm value. Hypothesis 6b proposes 
a positive linear relationship between financial leverage and the alliance-firm value link. 
Results from Table 3.3 show that neither a firm’s level of free cash flow nor its financial 
leverage affect how much it will gain value following the announcement of an alliance (ρ = -
.03, p > .15 and ρ = -.03, p > .30, respectively). Instead, our findings indicate that these 
effects are heterogeneous. Contrary to the curvilinear relationship proposed in Hypotheses 6a, 
we found no evidence for such an effect on the relationship between the level of free cash 
flow and the impact of strategic alliances on firm value (βFree cash flow squared = .22, n.s.). We 
tested potential sources of heterogeneity in the impact of financial leverage on the link 
between alliance formation and firm value, by investigating the role of governance structure, 
geographic scope, and industry sector of the alliance as moderators. Results from Table 3.3 
show that the effects of financial leverage are more positive for equity alliances (β = .39, p < 
.01) that are formed in manufacturing industries (β = .67, p < .01). This may perhaps reflect 
the fact equity alliances in manufacturing provide more tangible guarantees that the debt can 
be serviced than non-equity alliances in non-manufacturing industries which are generally 
associated with less formalized agreements and less tangible assets. 
Collaborative conditions and firm performance. Having examined the differential 
impact of distinct motives for alliance formation on the link between strategic alliances and 
firm performance and identified some moderators of these effects, we now analyze the impact 
of the collaborative conditions of the alliance on firm value. 
According to Hypothesis 7d, the partnering firm’s share in the ownership of equity 
alliances has no significant effect on the impact of strategic alliances on firm value. The  
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findings of Table 3.2 provide no support for this hypothesis. Instead, the meta-analytic 
evidence shows that a firm’s share in equity alliances has a positive effect on its ability to 
appropriate value from the strategic alliance (ρ = .07, p < .05) but also that this effect is 
heterogeneous. We investigated potential sources of heterogeneity in this relationship by 
conducting weighted regression analyses with geographic scope and industry sector of the 
alliance as moderators. The results in Table 3.3 show that owning a large equity share in 
international alliances has a marginally significant negative effect on firm value (β = -.51, p < 
.07). This finding appears to support the notion that leaving local partners with a high share 
of the alliance assures that they will provide the all-important knowledge and support needed 
to operate in foreign countries (e.g., Beamish, 1984). 
Hypotheses 8a and 8b suggest that whether the partner is a for-profit firm or a state-
owned company and the history of prior direct ties between the alliance partners shape the 
relational structure of the alliance and influence its effects on firm performance. Our results 
provide support for the predicted negative effects on firm value of for-profit firms forming 
alliances with a foreign state-owned company (ρ = .10, p < .05). The effect of the existence of 
prior ties between the partnering firms is small and only marginally significant (ρ = .06, p < 
.06). In other words, the prior history of cooperation between the partnering firms has very 
limited impact on the effect of subsequent alliances on firm value. 
Hypotheses 9a-f focus on the impact of alliance and country experience on the 
performance effects of strategic alliances. Contrary to Hypothesis 9a, results reported in 
Table 3.3 show a U-shaped relationship, instead of the predicted inverted U-shaped link, 
between alliance experience and the economic impact of strategic alliances: the coefficient of 
the alliance experience/quadratic term is positive and significant at the 5% confidence level 
(βAlliance experience squared = 1.07, p < .05). This suggests that firms may inappropriately generalize 
from their experience when this experience is still limited rather than, as predicted, when this  
  75
experience is relatively extensive. Accordingly, our findings also suggest that persistent 
exploitation of a firm’s alliance management knowledge and routines may not lead to the 
increasing crystallization of knowledge in the form of a simplified, narrow and rigid 
knowledge base (Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001), as hypothesized, but instead become 
progressively refined and responsive to the idiosyncrasies of each new venture. Moreover, 
contrary to Hypothesis 9b, we find that the effect of cultural distance becomes significantly 
more negative as firms accumulate alliance experience (β = -.73, p < .05. This effect may 
perhaps reflect the fact that the accumulation of alliance experience in dealing with distant 
cultures, rather than being effective, may lead firms to make inappropriate generalizations 
and apply a consistent set of alliance management routines across a heterogeneous set of 
cultural conditions. Thus, the probability that generalizations would be dysfunctional is likely 
to become higher when interacting with culturally distant partners leading to negative 
consequences for firm performance. We do not test Hypothesis 9c on the value of alliance 
experience for managing alliances with state-owned partners because there is no evidence 
that the link between the type of partner and the performance effects of alliances is moderated 
by any variable. We also find that the market rewards firms with greater experience with the 
host country with a larger gain in firm value (ρ = .09, p < .01)
8, thus providing support for 
Hypothesis 9d. Finally, consistent with Hypotheses 9e and 9f, results reported in Table 3.3 
indicate that the effect of alliance experience (β = .32, p < .05) and country experience (β = 
.54,  p < .05) are higher for equity alliances than for non-equity alliances. These results 
suggests that past experience in entering a focal country and in signing alliances is seen by 
the market as more valuable for equity than for non-equity alliances, suggesting that 
experiential learning is more beneficial in managing interorganizational cooperation when 
                                                 
8 As an additional test of the hypothesized difference between the effects of alliance experience and country 
experience, we examined whether the relationship between country experience and the performance effects of 
strategic was curvilinear. Results from a moderator analysis provide no support for such a curvilinear 
relationship (βCountry experience squared = -.60, p > .50).  
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this cooperation is not governed by detailed ex ante contracts. 
DISCUSSION 
The overall economic significance of strategic alliances and their pervasiveness across 
countries and industries highlight the importance of understanding whether they are on 
average creating or destroying value, and the conditions under which they yield a positive or 
negative impact on firm value. Despite the large number of empirical studies extant research 
provides no consensus on this effect (Gulati, 1998). The present meta-analysis cumulates two 
decades of research to answer this question. 
Do firms benefit from entering strategic alliances? Based on a meta-analysis of 110 
studies examining 32,596 strategic alliances formed between 1963 and 2001, our results lead 
to the strong conclusion that, on average, alliances create value and that this value is larger 
than comparable meta-analytic estimates of the gains obtained by bidders in mergers and 
acquisitions (Datta et al., 1992). Importantly, we find that this effect generalizes across time 
periods, industry sectors, and equity and non-equity alliances. We also find, however, that 
international alliances create more value for firms listed on US than on foreign stock 
exchanges, reflecting perhaps differences in the institutional environments in which firms 
operate or differences in the international strategies of U.S. and non-U.S. firms. 
Alliances, however, are highly heterogeneous and perhaps more important from a 
theoretical and managerial perspective is to understand how the impact on the partnering 
firms varies with the diversity in motives for alliance formation and in the collaborative 
conditions under which they operate. The present paper offers a theoretical synthesis and a 
meta-analysis on the determinants of the impact of strategic alliances on firm value. Our 
results resolve several enduring empirical inconsistencies and suggest new theoretical 
extensions by offering empirical evidence on contingencies not addressed in prior research. 
Table 3.4 provides a summary of our results.  
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TABLE 3.4 
Summary of Results for the Determinants of the Effects of Strategic Alliances on Firm 
Value
a 
Variable Predicted  sign  Result  Hypothesis 
supported? 
Level of economic integration 
between home and host countries 
∩  ∩  Yes 




Alliance relatedness  ∩  ∩  Yes 
Partner relatedness  Non-significant  Moderated by 
governance structure, 
and geographic scope 
No 
Functional domain of the alliance  Marketing and 
production alliances > 
R&D alliances 




Industry concentration  +  Moderated by 
industry sector 
No 
Intangible assets  +  +  Yes 




Financial leverage  +  Moderated by 
governance structure, 
geographic scope, 
and industry sector 
No 




R&D alliances × Equity alliance  +  +  Yes 
Governance structure: equity vs. non-
equity 
Non-significant Non-significant  Yes 
Equity share in the alliance  Non-significant  +  No 
Alliance with foreign state-owned 
firm vs. for-profit firm 
- -  Yes 
Prior ties  +  Non-significant  No 
Alliance experience  ∩  ∪  No 
Cultural distance × Alliance 
experience 
+ -  No 
Alliance with foreign state-owned 
firm × Alliance experience 
+ Not  applicable  No 
Country experience  +  +  Yes 
Alliance experience × Equity alliance  +  +  Yes 
Country experience × Equity alliance  +  +  Yes 
a The moderators governance structure, geographic scope, and industry sector of the alliance refer to 
differences between equity vs. non-equity alliances, international vs. domestic alliances, and alliances 
formed in manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing industries, respectively.  
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A key issue in alliance research is the relationship between the motives for alliance 
formation and firm value. This is important because it defines the scope of strategies and 
activities that can effectively be pursued in strategic alliances. Our results show that alliances 
allow firms to create value when pursuing a wide variety of strategies: expanding across 
geographic and product-market boundaries, exploiting knowledge interdependencies with 
other firms, and leveraging firm-specific assets across multiple domains. Interestingly, our 
results show that for most of the motives investigated, value creation, rather than being 
uniform, only occurs under a restricted set of contingencies. Thus, we find that international 
expansion is most successful when the host country’s economy is moderately integrated with 
the economy of the partnering firm’s home country. We also found that alliances can create 
value when they explore both similarities (high relatedness) and complementarities (low 
relatedness) between the alliance partners. In addition, we found that R&D alliances create 
more value than production or marketing alliances, but that equity R&D alliances create more 
firm value than non-equity R&D alliances. Our findings also suggest that the economic gains 
from increased market power obtained by establishing alliances in highly concentrated 
industries are higher in non-manufacturing than in manufacturing industries. We found that 
firms may create value by exploiting firm-specific intangible assets but our results show that 
this effect is not homogenous. Finally, our results indicate that the effect of the partnering 
firms’ level of financial resources on the performance benefits of alliances depends on the 
source of these financial resources. Free cash flow has no consistent impact on the effects of 
alliances on firm value. In contrast, financial leverage creates more value in equity alliances 
formed in manufacturing industries. Collectively, these findings suggest that strategic 
alliances are flexible organizational mechanisms that can be employed to pursue multiple 
paths of corporate development but that value creation in strategic alliances is highly 
sensitive to a number of contingencies related to the type of interdependence that is exploited  
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between the partners, the firm-specific assets owned by the partnering firms, and the level of 
relatedness between the partnering firms and the alliance activity. 
Our results show that the performance effects of strategic alliances are also 
determined by a wide range of collaborative conditions. Our finding that a high share of 
equity ownership in international alliances decreases firm value relative to a high share of 
equity ownership in domestic alliances suggests that allocating a high share of the alliance to 
local partners is critical to create an incentive structure that ensures that they will provide the 
all-important knowledge and support needed to operate in foreign countries. We also found 
that the relational structure of the alliance has important performance implications. In 
particular, the high coordination costs of partnering with a foreign state-owned company have 
negative effects on firm value. Contrary to our predictions, the positive effect of the existence 
of prior direct ties between the partnering firms on the impact of strategic alliances on firm 
value was only marginally significant. Moreover, these effects were only marginally 
heterogeneous suggesting that these findings are relatively robust. Importantly, our findings 
also provide new theoretical insights into the dynamics of organizational learning. Our 
research shows that while the experience of managing alliances has a U-shaped relationship 
with firm value, host country experience has a linear positive effect on firm value. In 
addition, we found that the effects of the accumulation of alliance and country experience 
differed between equity and on-equity alliances. These findings have important implications. 
Taken together, they suggest that the dynamics, processes, and consequences of the 
development of organizational knowledge and capabilities may differ significantly across 
experience domains.  
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Limitations and Future Research 
Prior research has investigated over 90 distinct determinants of the link between 
strategic alliances and firm value. The plurality of theoretical perspectives and the limited 
overlap among studies in the variables chosen to explain the performance consequences of 
alliances implies that addressing this issue requires both a theoretical and an empirical 
synthesis of prior research. In this paper we offer a conceptual framework that integrates a 
wide range of determinants of the effects of strategic alliances on firm value. However, like 
any meta-analysis our study is limited to a subset of variables that have been repeatedly 
addressed in extant empirical studies. In addition, although our conceptual model proposes a 
contingency perspective on the determinants of the impact of alliance announcements on firm 
value, we where unable to fully investigate empirically its theoretical implications due to the 
limited availability of primary studies that provided empirical data on the performance effects 
of both distinct motives for alliance formation and distinct collaborative conditions. 
These limitations and our meta-analytic evidence raise new theoretical questions and 
highlight the need for a new wave of empirical research investigating the link between 
strategic alliances and firm value. First, future theoretical and empirical research could 
develop, extend, and test the proposed conceptual framework. The integrative conceptual 
framework proposed in this paper suggests that the collaborative conditions under which 
strategic alliances operate can not only have a direct effect on the link between strategic 
alliances and firm value but, importantly, can moderate the link between the type of 
interdependence or asset exploited in the alliance and firm performance. This extends prior 
research on the economic consequences of strategic alliances which has dominantly 
emphasized the direct effects of alliance motives and collaborative conditions on firm value. 
Thus, rather than examining how distinct types of interdependencies or distinct collaborative 
conditions directly influence the effects of strategic alliances on firm value, the proposed  
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framework highlights the need for future research investigating how a particular type of 
interdependence (e.g., combination of complementary assets and activities) can have different 
impacts on firm value depending on the collaborative conditions under which it is exploited 
(e.g., differences in alliance experience). For instance, does the impact on firm value of 
having had prior ties depends on the motive for alliance formation, that is whether the 
alliance is formed to exploit economies of scale by combining similar activities, or to create 
value by exploiting complementarity between the knowledge base of the partnering firms? 
Future research could also extend the proposed framework by investigating the performance 
implications of different alliance motives or collaborative conditions not addressed in our 
meta-analysis. 
Second, our results show that there remains some heterogeneity in research findings 
for most antecedents of the performance consequences of strategic alliances. This finding 
points to the need for more research on the relationship between each of the examined 
antecedents and firm value, especially in a multivariate context. Third, while prior research 
has focused primarily on theoretical innovation, emphasizing new determinants, future 
research should balance theoretical innovation with empirical replication (Eden, 2002). This 
would not only provide a more robust framework for testing the explanatory power of new 
determinants, but would also contribute to the development of a more consistent empirical 
base on which to build future empirical generalizations and move research on the 
performance effects of strategic alliances beyond its current preparadigm state toward a state 
of normal science (Kuhn, 1962).  
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Conclusion 
Strategic alliances are a pervasive mode of corporate development. They also differ 
markedly in their motives, collaborative conditions, and the environments in which they 
operate. The present paper provides an integrative theoretical framework and meta-analytic 
evidence on a wide range of conditions under which alliances create and destroy economic 
value for the firms entering them. Our findings show that alliances provide a flexible 
mechanism for corporate development but that there are boundaries for value creation in 
strategic alliances. Our meta-analysis sheds new light on these boundaries: it reconciles 
inconsistent empirical findings, and extends prior research on the contingencies of value 
creation. We hope that the conceptual framework and the meta-analytic results provided in 
this paper will stimulate future research on the determinants of the link between strategic 





DETERMINANTS OF STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
PERFORMANCE: A META-ANALYSIS 
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES have emerged over the past two decades as a prevalent mode 
of corporate development. They have also become a topic of central interest to organizational 
and strategy scholars, who have investigated the antecedents of alliance formation, the choice 
of governance structure, and how these initial conditions and subsequent partner behaviors 
influence alliance performance. Yet, despite continued scholarly effort, Gulati (1998) 
concluded in a review of the literature that understanding the determinants of alliance 
performance “remains one of the most interesting and also one of the most vexing questions” 
in the study of strategic alliances (p. 309). Indeed, prior empirical research on alliance 
performance has adopted a variety of theoretical perspectives which have not often been 
integrated. The emphasis on the development and testing of new theory rather than on 
empirical generalization has led to over 100 distinct variables being investigated as 
antecedents of alliance performance. Also, prior studies have produced inconsistent findings 
with respect to the relative contribution, magnitude, statistical significance, and direction of 
the determinants of alliance performance. To date, these findings have not been 
systematically combined to establish the generalizability of the antecedents of alliance 
performance and thus, despite considerable empirical research, no clear consensus exists 
regarding these antecedents. 
                                                 
9 This chapter is the result of joint work with Rekha Krishnan. The list of studies included in this meta-analysis 
is provided in Appendix A. 
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Given the prevalence of diverse theoretical perspectives and the inconsistency of 
empirical findings, the purpose of this study is to provide a meta-analysis of the determinants 
of strategic alliance performance using data from 78 empirical studies involving 15,201 
alliances. Thus, while Chapter 3 examined the link between alliance formation and firm 
value, the present chapter adopts a complementary level of analysis and investigates the 
antecedents of the performance of alliances themselves. Meta-analysis is a statistical 
technique for aggregating results across multiple empirical studies while correcting for 
potential sources of variation in study findings, such as sampling and measurement errors. 
Specifically, the present research has three objectives: (a) to identify among de wide range of 
determinants of alliance performance investigated in prior research those factors that 
effectively impact alliance performance and estimate with precision the magnitude of their 
effects, (b) to evaluate the generalizability of these effects across different empirical contexts 
and distinct operationalizations of alliance performance, and (c) to estimate the joint effect of 
initial conditions, governance structure and partner behavior on alliance performance by 
developing and testing an overall conceptual framework that includes those factors that have 
been most frequently linked to alliance performance. By cumulating empirical evidence 
across a wide range of empirical studies we are able to establish firm empirical 
generalizations on the determinants of strategic alliance performance. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The performance of strategic alliances has been investigated from a variety of 
theoretical perspectives (Kogut, 1988; Reuer, 2004), including resource-based theory (e.g., 
Park and Martin, 2001), transaction cost economics (e.g., Sampson, 2004), real options (e.g., 
Kumar, 2005), and organizational learning theory (e.g., Barkema, Shenkar, Vermeulen, and 
Bell, 1997). These diverse perspectives have each emphasized the role of distinct types of 
factors in influencing alliance performance. Collectively, prior research has shown that  
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alliance performance is jointly determined by (a) the conditions present at the inception of the 
alliance, (b) the type of governance structure used in the alliance, and (c) the post-formation 
cooperative dynamics between the alliance partners. However, prior studies have been 
generally informed by a single theoretical perspective and as a result the different factors 
have not often been empirically investigated simultaneously within the same study. The 
model presented in Figure 4.1 draws on these diverse streams of research to examine the 
structural and behavioral determinants of alliance performance. To obtain robust meta-
analytic estimates the conceptual model focuses on those factors that have been most 
frequently investigated in prior research. 
Initial Conditions 
Resource complementarity. Strategic alliances create value by providing an efficient 
governance mechanism for exploiting interdependencies between firms. Indeed, research 
adopting a transaction cost perspective has shown that alliances are formed when access to 
the relevant resources cannot be obtained through market transactions and when the relevant 
resources are linked to undesired assets and cannot be acquired separately (e.g., Hennart, 
1991; Hennart and Reddy, 1997). The combination of resources owned by different firms is, 
therefore, the primary motive driving alliance formation and has a central influence on 
partner selection. For instance, Hitt et al. (2000) have shown that when forming international 
alliances firms seek partners that possess complementary resources and capabilities.  
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FIGURE 4.1 
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a “Objectives” indicates that the dependent variable is the extent to which the alliance objectives were attained, and “Composite” indicates that the dependent 
variables is composite alliance performance. 
† p < .10;
 * p < .05; 
** p < .01  
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Alliances may create value by combining similar resources, capabilities or activities 
to achieve economies of scale and share risks, or by pooling complementary resources, 
capabilities or activities to achieve economies of scope (Hennart, 1988). The combination of 
complementary resources may also increase the competitive position of the alliance by 
creating a distinctive bundle of resources and activities that is valuable, rare, and difficult to 
imitate or substitute (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Hence, because value can be created by 
combining complementary or similar assets and activities in an alliance we predict: 
Hypothesis 1. The level of resource complementarity between the alliance partners 
will have no effect on alliance performance. 
The nature of the resources combined in a strategic alliance may also have an indirect 
effect on alliance performance by influencing the choice of governance structure. The 
combination of complementary resources and activities requires considerable coordination 
between the alliance partners arising from the ongoing mutual adjustments needed to couple 
distinct resources and activities into an integrated process of value creation and thus realize 
the potential synergies from the alliance. Thus, the interdependence associated with resource 
complementarity may entail higher coordination costs in managing the alliance (Gulati and 
Singh, 1998). 
Resource complementarity may create also a situation of cooperative co-
specialization in which alliances are vehicles for exchanging access to idiosyncratic resources 
and capabilities owned by the alliance partners rather than for the voluntary or involuntary 
transfer of capabilities. Indeed, in a study of technological alliances Mowery, Oxley, and 
Silverman (1996) found that most alliances led to the cooperative co-specialization between 
the alliance partners in terms of their technological capabilities, and that in only 24 percent of 
alliances did the partners’ technological capabilities become similar over time. However, 
mutual interdependence between the alliance partners stemming from cooperative co- 
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specialization may become asymmetrical dependence if one of the partners opportunistically 
internalizes the other partner’s knowledge or capabilities (Zeng and Hennart, 2002). As a 
result, resource complementarity may also be associated with high appropriation concerns 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998; Zeng and Hennart, 2002). The anticipated coordination costs and 
appropriation concerns associated with alliances where partners pool complementary 
resources are, therefore, likely to lead the development of more complex contracts in an 
attempt to reduce opportunism by establishing safeguards and rules for responding to a wide 
range of contingencies (Parkhe, 1993). Hence, 
Hypothesis 2. The level of resource complementarity between the alliance partners 
will be positively related to the level of contractual safeguards embedded in the 
strategic alliance. 
Prior alliances. Strategic alliances are not always discrete and independent events. 
Indeed, on many occasions firms engage in multiple sequential alliances over time whereby a 
particular alliance may be preceded by a history of cooperation between the alliance partners 
(e.g., Gulati, 1995). The accumulation of partner-specific experience through repeated 
alliances may in turn influence alliance performance in several ways. First, the accumulation 
of cooperative experience at the dyadic level, allows the partnering firms to increase their 
knowledge of each other’s organizational processes, resources and capabilities and develop 
partner-specific routines regarding information exchange, conflict resolution and cooperation 
(Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002). The presence of these routines at the inception of the 
alliance is likely to have a positive effect on the post-formation interaction between the 
alliance partners, facilitate information exchange and promote cooperative behavior. Prior 
research also suggests that the willingness of partnering firms to form repeated alliances is 
likely to reflect the presence of mutual trust between the alliance partners (Gulati, 1995). This 
baseline level of trust, present at the inception of an alliance, is likely to transfer to the new  
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cooperative venture. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3a-b. The presence of prior alliances between the partnering firms will be 
positively related to (a) the level of information exchange and (b) the level of 
cooperative behavior in the strategic alliance. 
Hypothesis 4. The presence of prior alliances between the partnering firms will be 
positively related to the level of trust in the strategic alliance. 
Besides influencing the post-formation dynamics between the alliance partners, the 
history of prior cooperation between the partnering firms may also impact alliance 
performance by influencing transactions costs. The initial level of trust stemming from prior 
alliances and the accumulated experience of cooperation may, at the stage of alliance 
formation, reduce fears of opportunism and create an expectation of predictability regarding 
each other’s behavior (Gulati, 1995). Because the development of complex contracts that 
stabilize partners’ responses to multiple contingencies is costly and may decrease flexibility, 
trust may be used as a substitute for contractual safeguards. (Parkhe, 1993). 
Hypothesis 5. The presence of prior alliances between the partnering firms will have 
a negative influence on the level of contractual safeguards embedded in the strategic 
alliance. 
National cultural distance. National cultural distance between the alliance partners 
captures the extent to which the shared societal values and norms differ between the countries 
of the partnering firms. High levels of national cultural distance are likely to be reflected in 
differences in the partners’ management systems and relational behaviors (e.g., Cushman and 
King, 1985; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Schuler and Rogovsky, 1998). These differences may in 
turn lead to conflicts and misunderstanding between the partnering firms, increase 
coordination costs, and create barriers to communication and knowledge transfer (e.g., Lyles 
and Salk, 1996). Hence,  
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Hypothesis 6. The level of national cultural distance between the partnering firms will 
be negatively related to the level of cooperative behavior in the strategic alliance. 
National cultural distance may also impact transaction costs and influence the 
governance structure of the alliance (e.g., Hennart and Reddy, 1997). Indeed, firms may 
attempt to counteract the potential conflicts arising from cultural distance by adopting a 
number of motivational or structural solutions that reduce transaction costs by manipulating 
the perceived or actual payoff structure of the alliance so that the gains of mutual cooperation 
are higher than those of unilateral defection (Hennart and Zeng, forthcoming). Motivational 
solutions, such as extending the expected length of interaction, operate by changing the 
partners’ perception of the gains of cooperation, while structural solutions, such as 
establishing a more extensive set of contractual safeguards, operate by increasing the 
economic gains of cooperation or costs of defection (Hennart and Zeng, forthcoming). 
Consistent with prior research on the determinants of alliance performance (e.g., Parkhe, 
1993), our model focused on contractual safeguards as a key mechanism for aligning 
partners’ incentives to cooperate. Because the potential hazards arising from high cultural 
distance between the partnering firms can be addressed by adopting a wide range of distinct 
structural and motivational solutions, we predict that, on average, no unique solution will 
dominate. Hence: 
Hypothesis 7. The level of national cultural distance between the partnering firms will 
be, on average, unrelated to the level of contractual safeguards embedded in the 
strategic alliance. 
Governance Structure 
Research on strategic alliances has emphasized the importance of governance 
structure as a central determinant of alliance performance (e.g., Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
The choice of governance structure is important because it provides a framework of rules and  
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incentives within which cooperation between the partnering firms unfolds and thus influences 
the partners’ ability to realize the potential value from pooling complementary resources. 
Prior research on the choice of governance structure and its performance implications 
for strategic alliances has been primarily based on transaction cost theory (e.g., Hennart, 
1988). The core proposition of this theory is that alliance performance is determined by the 
extent to which the partnering firms align the properties of the governance structure with the 
attributes of the underlying transaction in a way that maximizes the partners’ joint incentive 
to cooperate and maximizes the rents that can be obtained from establishing the cooperative 
venture (Sampson, 2004). Contractual safeguards and equity distribution constitute two 
important parameters in the design of governance structures that can be used to create joint 
incentives and curb opportunism. 
Contractual safeguards. Contractual safeguards may create joint incentives for 
cooperation and limit opportunism in several ways. First, by establishing more complex 
contracts that specify partners’ responses to multiple contingencies and establish rules and 
procedures for dispute resolution and for responding to unanticipated outcomes, partnering 
firms may increase the predictability of each other’s behavior and restrict the range of 
circumstances in which opportunism might occur (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Second, 
contracts may be used to minimize monitoring costs by specifying performance measurement 
systems such as performance targets, third party monitoring, or the exchange of operational 
information (Lui and Ngo, 2004; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Finally, contracts may reduce 
opportunism by specifying a payoff structure that rewards mutual cooperation and increases 
the costs arising from unilateral or mutual defection (Lui and Ngo, 2004; Parkhe, 1993). 
However, because contractual safeguards are only one of the distinct mechanisms available to 
protect the partnering firms against opportunism and to increase the level of cooperative 
behavior among the alliance partners (Hennart and Zeng, forthcoming) we expect that, on  
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average, there will be no systematic link between the level of contractual safeguards and the 
level of cooperative behavior in the alliance. Moreover, transaction cost theory postulates that 
firms typically select the optimal level of contractual safeguards for governing 
interorganizational cooperation in a way that reflects transaction characteristics and 
maximizes cooperation between the alliance partners (Hennart, 1988). Hence,  
Hypothesis 8. The level of contractual safeguards embedded in the strategic alliance 
will be unrelated to the level of cooperative behavior exhibited by the alliance 
partners. 
Equity distribution. In equity alliances the distribution of equity ownership between 
the alliance partners provides a powerful mechanism for maximizing the partnering firms’ 
incentive to cooperate. Equity alliances align joint incentives by rewarding the partnering 
firms with a share of the residual profits of the alliance, rather than by specifying in an ex-
ante contract the partners’ contribution and the profit distribution (Hennart and Zeng, 
forthcoming). Thus, they are particularly valuable under conditions in which it is difficult to 
evaluate a priori what is being exchanged, such as when partners are transferring tacit 
knowledge (Hennart, 1988). Equity alliances are also efficient in unstable and uncertain 
environments where changes in the alliance may be required to ensure adaptation but the 
direction of these changes in unknown (Hennart, 1988). In these conditions, repeated 
modifications and renegotiation of the alliance contract to respond to environmental changes 
could prove costly and slow. In the context of equity alliances an important factor is the 
distribution of equity ownership between the alliance partners. Strategic alliances where both 
partners have an equal share of the ownership provide both partners with an equal claim on 
the alliance profits and costs. Indeed, shared equity distribution is the ownership distribution 
arrangement where cooperation brings the maximum joint benefits and unilateral defection 
the highest penalty for the alliance partners. Thus, by creating a payoff structure that  
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maximizes the partnering firms’ joint incentive to cooperate, shared equity alliances should 
have a positive effect on the post-formation interaction between the partners. Thus, 
Hypothesis 9a-b. Shared equity distribution between the partnering firms will be 
positively related to (a) the level of information exchange and (b) the level of 
cooperative behavior in the strategic alliance. 
Interorganizational trust. Prior research suggests that interorganizational trust may 
also operate as an important governance mechanism in strategic alliances (e.g., Popo and 
Zenger, 2002; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). Interorganizational trust reflects the 
bilateral expectation that the alliance partner’s behaviors will be predicable, consistent with 
initial commitments and non-opportunistic (Zaheer et al., 1998). Trust may play multiple 
roles in governing the combination of resources and activities in the alliance (Zaheer et al., 
1998). First, because the presence of mutual trust is associated with low expectation of 
opportunism, trust is likely to be accompanied by lower monitoring activities and will 
facilitate negotiations. This in turn should reduce transaction and monitoring costs, and 
increase the alliance’s adaptiveness to changing environments. Second, the expectations that 
the partner is both willing and able to fulfill its commitments and will refrain from acting 
opportunistically should promote information exchange and increase mutual cooperation in 
the alliance (Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001). Hence, 
Hypothesis 10a-b. The level of interorganizational trust between the partnering firms 
will be positively related to (a) the level of information exchange and (b) the level of 
cooperative behavior in the strategic alliance. 
There has been considerable debate regarding the status of contractual safeguards and 
trust as governance mechanisms. A number of authors have suggested that, relative to 
contractual safeguards, trust provides an alternative mechanism for governing the 
combination of resources (e.g., Aulakh, Kotabe, and Sahay, 1996; Bradach and Eccles, 1989;  
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Faulkner, 2000; Gulati, 1995). These studies suggest that trust may function as a substitute 
for contract-based control by providing a more effective mechanism for reducing 
opportunism, providing incentives for cooperation, and reducing the costs of adaptation. In 
contrast, other studies suggest that trust may complement, rather than substitute, formal 
governance mechanisms such as contractual safeguards (e.g., Luo, 2002b; Poppo and Zenger, 
2002; Lui and Ngo, 2004). Poppo and Zenger (2002) suggest, for instance, that while 
contracts provide a baseline set of procedures to regulate cooperation and the payoff structure 
under a foreseeable set of contingencies, trust promotes cooperation and adaptation under 
conditions of unexpected or unpredictable change and may counteract exchange hazards that 
are not contractually specified. These divergent theoretical perspectives lead to opposing 
predictions. The notion of substitutability suggests that the governance of strategic alliances 
is primarily based on one type of mechanism, either contractual safeguards or trust (Poppo 
and Zenger, 2002). Hence, 
Hypothesis 11a. The level of interorganizational trust between the partnering firms 
will be negatively related to the level of contractual safeguards embedded in the 
strategic alliance. 
The notion of complementarity suggests, instead, that the presence of mutually agreed 
contracts may promote the development of mutual trust between the partnering firms and that 
the presence of trust may also facilitate the renegotiation and flexibility of contractual 
safeguards (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). Thus, 
Hypothesis 11b. The level of interorganizational trust between the partnering firms will 
be positively related to the level of contractual safeguards embedded in the strategic alliance. 
Post-Formation Dynamics 
Although initial conditions and the choice of governance structure are central 
elements in alliance formation, the ability to realize the potential value from pooling  
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resources and activities owned by different firms is primarily determined by the post-
formation interaction between the alliance partners and how it evolves over time. Indeed, a 
number of theoretical accounts and clinical studies on the evolution of alliances suggest that 
both the imprinting effects of initial conditions and governance decisions, and the relational 
processes that unfold between the partnering firms are fundamental to understanding alliance 
performance (e.g., Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). 
Prior research suggests that cooperative behavior and information exchange, or the lack 
thereof, are fundamental parameters that characterize the post-formation dynamics between 
the alliance partners (e.g., Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, and 
Aulakh, 2001). 
Information exchange reflects the frequency, quality, breath and depth of information 
exchanged between the partnering firms (e.g., Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Frequent and 
detailed information exchange facilitates the coordination of the alliance activities, reduces 
information asymmetries, facilitates the identification of new opportunities for exploiting 
complementarities between the partners, and increases the speed and flexibility of adaptation 
to internal or external changes with positive effects on alliance performance. 
Cooperative behavior refers to the extent to which the partners deliberately engage in 
activities focused on ensuring coordination, respond to the needs of the other partner, strive to 
achieve mutually beneficial solutions in conflict resolution, and are committed to maintaining 
a satisfactory partnership (e.g., Luo, 2002b; Mohr and Spekman, 1994). Thus, cooperative 
behavior is likely to facilitate conflict resolution, to increase coordination and to encourage 
investments in relationship-specific assets. Thus, 
Hypothesis 12a-b. The level of (a) information exchange and (b) cooperative behavior 
will be positively related to alliance performance 
An important feature of alliance arrangements is that they will need to be changed as  
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events unfold (Ariño and de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). In 
particular, the accumulation of collaborative experience is likely to lead to the development 
of relational routines between the alliance partners (Deed and Rothaermel, 2003; Zollo et al., 
2002). These routines may encompass multiple domains of the relationships including 
coordination of the operational activities, conflict resolution, and information exchange, and 
may have positive effects on alliance performance. Hence, 
Hypothesis 13a-c. Alliance age will be positively related to (a) the level of 
information exchange and (b) cooperative behavior between the alliance partners, 
and (c) alliance performance. 
METHODS 
Sample 
We combined multiple data collection strategies to identify empirical studies of 
strategic alliance performance. First, articles were identified through a bibliographic search of 
computerized databases. ABI/Inform Global, EconLit, JSTOR, Kluwer Online, Elsevier 
Science Direct, and the Social Science Citation Index were searched using the terms ‘joint 
venture(s)’ and ‘strategic alliance(s)’. Second, we performed manual searches (over the 1980 
to 2004 period) of 10 leading journals in management and marketing, including Academy of 
Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of International Business 
Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Marketing Research, 
Management Science, Organization Science, Organization Studies, and Strategic 
Management Journal. Third, we performed Internet searches using standard search engines. 
Finally, we examined the reference sections of all the articles retrieved and of prior narrative 
reviews of the strategic alliance literature (e.g., Gulati, 1998). 
Inclusion criteria. We determined the eligibility of studies for the meta-analysis on 
the basis of several criteria. First, we focused on studies that measured alliance performance  
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in terms of objective financial indicators or informants’ perceptual assessment of 
performance. Studies based on alliance duration as a proxy for performance were excluded 
because duration fails to distinguish between the different causes of termination. Alliance 
termination may be due to failure, itself a result of partner behavior or of outside events over 
which they have no control (Hennart, Roehl and Zeng, 2002), or to success, as the alliance is 
disbanded having achieved its goal. Moreover, longevity may not reflect performance but 
may instead reflect the presence of barriers to exiting the alliance (Gulati, 1998; Hennart, 
Roehl, Zietlow, 1999). Second, a study had to report on one or more relationships between an 
antecedent of performance and a measure of alliance performance. Third, a study had to 
report the sample size and correlations or other statistics that could be transformed into 
correlation coefficients using the formulas provided by Hunter and Schmidt (1990: 272). 
Coding.  The two authors independently coded each study. The construct 
operationalizations reported in the original studies were used to classify all correlations. 
Table 4.1 provides a summary overview of the definitions of the constructs used in the 
present study. The coding process identified five distinct operationalizations of alliance 
performance: (a) measures of alliance performance based on informants’ assessment of the 
extent to which the alliance attained its initial objectives; (b) composite measures of alliance 
performance that measured the outcomes of the alliance in terms of many criteria, typically 
including overall satisfaction with the alliance, economic performance, quality of 
collaboration, and knowledge transfer; (c) measures based exclusively on economic 
indicators of alliance performance such as return on investment or market share of the 
alliance; (d) measures based on the informants’ overall satisfaction with the alliance; and (e) 
measures based on the informants’ overall satisfaction with the partner. Although we coded 
correlations relating the various determinants of alliance performance to each of the five 
indicators, only for three measures (attainment of objectives, composite performance, and  
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economic performance) was there sufficient cumulative evidence (three or more independent 
estimates) to warrant their inclusion in the meta-analysis (cf. Dalton, Daily, Certo, and 
Roengpitya, 2003). The overall level of interrater reliability for coding decisions was 98%. 
Inconsistencies were resolved through discussion. 
Nonindependence.  To ensure that our analysis met the assumption of sample 
independence, we used two criteria. First, if a sample reported more than one correlation for a 
single relationship, these correlations were averaged and only the average correlation was 
included in the meta-analysis. Second, if multiple publications were based on the same or 
partially overlapping dataset, we did not include correlations between the same variables 
from more than one study. In such cases, we included the correlation based on the larger 
sample size. 
Outliers. Outlying correlations were identified by computing Huffcutt and Arthur’s 
(1995) sample-adjusted meta-analytic deviancy statistic. On the basis of these analyses, 14 
outliers were dropped from the dataset. This process resulted in a final dataset of 265 
correlations from 78 empirical studies each corresponding to an independent sample with a 
total sample size of 15,201 strategic alliances. The removal of outliers is important because 
meta-analyses often include a limited number of studies that due to their idiosyncratic 
methodological features (Schmidt et al., 1993) or sample composition can have considerable 
impact on the results. However, because the uniqueness of their methodology or sample it is 
often not possible to correct for these characteristics when estimating the meta-analytic 
correlation. 
In the present study, outliers generally led to larger estimated correlations for the 
relationships investigated while results remained consistent with those of the analysis 
reported below. Thus, by removing outliers we provide more conservative results.  
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TABLE 4.1 
Definition of Constructs and Representative Measures 
Construct Definition  and  Measures 
Complementarity  Construct definition: The extent to which the strategic alliance pools 
complementary assets, knowledge, or activities. 
Representative measures: Luo (2002a); Lyles and Salk (1996) 
Prior ties  Construct definition: Number of prior alliances between the partnering firms. 




Construct definition: The level of national cultural distance between the alliance 
partners, typically measured using Kogut and Singh’s (1988) index. 
Representative measures: Fey and Beamish (2001); Luo and Park (2004) 
Shared Equity 
Ownership 
Construct definition: Indicates strategic alliances characterized by the equal 
distribution of equity ownership between the alliance partners. 




Construct definition: The extent to which the alliance partners share a bilateral 
expectation that each other’s behaviors will be predicable, consistent with 
initial commitments and non-opportunistic. 




Construct definition: The extent to which the contract governing the alliance is 
detailed, highly customized, includes an extensive set of terms, clauses, and 
procedures and specifies responses to a wide range of contingencies 
concerning the establishment, operation, decision-making, conflict resolution, 
and termination of the strategic alliance. 
Representative measures:Luo (2002b); Parkhe (1993) 
Alliance age  Construct definition: The number of years since the formation of the alliance. 
Representative measures: Hoang and Rothaermel (2005); Lyles and Salk (1996) 
Information 
exchange 
Construct definition: The extent, frequency, timeliness, and openness of 
information exchange between the partnering firms. 
Representative measures: Mohr and Spekman (1994); Smith and Barclay (1997) 
Cooperative 
behavior 
Construct definition: The extent to which the alliance partners are responsive to 
each other’s goals, and deliberately attempt to work together and manage the 
alliance in a way that is mutually satisfactory and achieves the goals of both 
partners 
Representative measures: Luo (2002b); Emden, Yaprak, and Cavusgil (2005) 
Attainment of 
objectives 
Construct definition: The extent to which the initial objectives of the alliance 
were achieved. 
Representative measures: Hatfield and Pearce (1994); Yan and Gray (2001) 
Composite 
performance 
Construct definition: Multidimensional measures of alliance performance that 
typically measure the outcomes of the alliance in terms of overall satisfaction 
with the alliance, economic performance, quality of collaboration, and 
knowledge transfer. 




Construct definition: The performance of the alliance measure in terms of 
financial and economic indicators such as ROI or ROS. 
Representative measures: Li, Lam, and Qian (2001); Luo (2002b)  
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Meta-Analytic Procedure 
Our meta-analysis was conducted using Hunter and Schmidt’s (1990) psychometric 
meta-analysis method. This approach allows for the correction of statistical artifacts, such as 
artificial dichotomization and measurement error, and thus provides a more precise estimate 
of the magnitude and variance of a relationship in the population of interest. Correlations 
were individually corrected for artificial dichotomization of continuous independent and 
dependent variables, range restriction in independent and dependent dichotomous variables, 
and for the downward bias in r as a measure of the population correlation (Hunter and 
Schmidt, 1990). These correlations were then meta-analyzed and corrected for sampling 
error. Finally, and since information on measurement error was not available for all 
individual correlations, the meta-analytic correlations were then corrected for measurement 
error in the dependent and independent variables using the method of artifact distributions 
(Hunter and Schmidt, 1990). We also estimated 95 percent confidence intervals around the 
mean-weighted correlations. This process yielded a meta-analytic correlation matrix, reported 
in Table 4.2, where the correlation coefficient in each cell is obtained from a meta-analysis of 
the relationship between the variables aggregated across all the studies synthesized. The table 
reports a sample-size-weighted average correlation corrected for statistic artifacts (ρ), the 
standard deviation of ρ (SDρ), the number of independent samples used to estimate each ρ (k), 






  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11 
1. Alliance age  -  787 (7)  882 (6)  1,360 (8)  882 (5)  322 (3)  1420 (9)  531 (3)  260 (3)  513 (6)  1,087 (10) 
2. Information exchange  -.07 (.00)  -  184 (2)  282 (2)  1,020 (6)  143 (2)  581 (4)  191 (2)  765 (8)  374 (5)  844 (7) 
3. Contractual safeguards  .03 (.15)  .03 (.00)  -  513 (2)  1,246 (4)  276 (3)  667 (5)  922 (4)  601 (5)  378 (3)  1744 (10) 
4. Shared ownership  -.10 (.13)  .18 (.10)  .10 (.20)  -  599 (3)  504 (3)  959 (5)  373 (2)  255 (1)  280 (4)  883 (7) 
5. Cooperative behavior  .12 (.00)  .39 (.09)  .10 (.00)  -.06 (.00)  -  960 (4)  737 (4)  821 (4)  792 (7)  728 (8)  1,065 (7) 
6. Complementarity  -.03 (.00)  .05 (.00)  .10 (.00)  -.06 (.00)  .18 (.05)  -  410 (4)  190 (2)  535 (5)  257 (4)  451 (5) 
7. Cultural distance  -.02 (.00)  .08 (.15)  -.00 (.14)  -.02 (.00)  .09 (.12)  .04 (.02)  -  493 (3)  249 (2)  114 (2)  1,146 (9) 
8. Prior ties  -.11 (.00)  -.09 (.00)  .07 (.00)  -.08 (.06)  .19 (.22)  -.08 (.00)  -.05 (.14)  -  499 (4)  522 (4)  1,170 (9) 
9. Interorganizational trust  -.04 (.09)  .42 (.10)  -.05 (.00)  -.13 (.00)  .41 (.21)  .04 (.2)  -.35 (.00)  .24 (.00)  -  529 (6)  1117 (10) 
10. Attainment of objectives  .39 (.17)  .33 (.00)  -.07 (.03)  .01 (.23)  .41 (.09)  .23 (.00)  -.11 (.00) .31  (.00) .58  (.22)  -  335  (3) 
11. Composite performance  .17 (.08)  .32 (.07)  .09 (.11)  -.14 (.00)  .49 (.17)  .22 (.07)  -.09 (.08) .30  (.00) .41  (.11) .30  (.00) - 
a Lower diagonal: mean corrected correlations ρ and standard deviations SDρ of ρ (in parentheses). Upper diagonal: total sample size N and number of studies 
k (in parentheses) from which the ρ were estimated. 
* indicates significant Q-statistic, suggesting the presence of moderators. 
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Moderator analysis.  For each meta-analytic correlation we conducted homogeneity 
analyses to evaluate the extent to which the estimated correlations were drawn from the same 
population. Homogeneity analyses were based on the Q statistic which follows a chi-square 
distribution (Hedges and Olkin, 1985). Significant values of Q indicate that the relationship is 
heterogeneous and suggest the presence of moderators in the relationship. For the determinants 
that had an heterogeneous impact on alliance performance we investigated the effect of three 
potential substantive moderators capturing important alliance and environmental characteristics: 
(a) form of the alliance: equity vs. non-equity alliances; (b) industry sector of the alliance: 
manufacturing vs. non-manufacturing; and (c) geographic scope of the alliance: domestic vs. 
international alliances. To test the effect of these potential moderators we performed weighted 
regression analyses in which sample size is used as a weight (Hedges and Olkin, 1985)
10. 
Structural equations modeling. The meta-analytic correlation matrix was used as an 
input to test our model. The measure of alliance performance based on economic indicators was 
not included in this analysis as the number of correlations between this measure and the other 
dependent and independent variables was too low. Because our model is recursive, parameters 
can be estimated using Ordinary Least Squares regression (e.g., Geyskens, Steenkamp, and 
Kumar, 1999). Since correlations in each cell were based on different sample sizes, model 
estimation was based on the harmonic mean N of 461. 
                                                 
10 To ensure stability in our results we restricted our moderator analyses to correlations based on five or more 




Table 4.3 presents the meta-analytic results for the direct effects of initial conditions, 
governance structure, and post-formation dynamics on three dimensions of alliance performance: 
(a) the extent to which the initial objectives of the alliance were attained (objectives); (b) a 
composite indicator of alliance performance (composite); and (c) economic performance 
(economic). 
The results indicate that initial conditions, interorganizational trust, and post-formation 
dynamics between the partnering firms are key drivers of alliance performance. Indeed, the type 
of resources and activities pooled in the alliance (ρobjectives = .23, ρcomposite = .22), the existence of 
prior alliances (ρobjectives = .31, ρcomposite = .30, ρeconomic = .21), the age of the alliance (ρobjectives = 
.39, ρcomposite = .17, ρeconomic = .32), and the level of interorganizational trust (ρobjectives = .58, 
ρcomposite = .41, ρeconomic = .41), of information exchange (ρobjectives = .33, ρcomposite = .32), and of 
cooperative behavior between the alliance partners (ρobjectives = .41, ρcomposite = .49, ρeconomic = .35) 
have relatively large and positive effects on performance, whether measured by the extent to 
which the partners are able to achieve the objectives of the alliance, by the composite 
performance of the alliance, or by its economic performance. 
In contrast, the cultural distance between the partners (ρcomposite = .09, ρeconomic = .10), the 
ownership structure of the alliance (ρobjectives = -.01, ρcomposite = .14, ρeconomic = .09), and the level 
of contractual safeguards (ρobjectives = .07, ρcomposite = .09) have relatively small direct effects on 
alliance performance. 
The positive performance effects of initial conditions reflect the importance of the 
resources combined in the alliance as the primary source of potential value creation. In addition,  
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the strong direct effects of post-formation dynamics highlight the role of the collaborative 
behavior between the partnering firms in realizing this potential value. Finally, the limited 
impact of formal governance mechanisms and cultural distance on alliance performance is likely 
to reflect the fact that, as hypothesized, these factors primarily influence the post-formation 
dynamics between the partnering firms and thus have an indirect rather than a direct effect on 
alliance performance. 
Moderator Analysis 
The results, reported in Table 4.3, show that the effects of most determinants of alliance 
performance generalize across primary studies. In fact, of the 23 effects investigated only 8 had 
heterogeneous effects on alliance performance, as indicated by significant Q-statistics. 
Specifically, our results show the presence of moderators for the effects of contractual 
safeguards, interorganizational trust, cooperative behavior, and alliance age on alliance 
performance. 
Table 4.4 reports the results of the moderator analyses. Results show that the 
performance effect of contractual safeguards is lower for equity alliances than for non-equity 
alliances (β = -.47; p < .10). Although only marginally significant, this finding suggests that the 
particular way in which parties to equity alliances are rewarded (i.e., by sharing the residual) acts 
as a self-enforcing substitute to ex-ante contracts (Hennart 1988) . In addition, results suggest 
that the performance effects of contractual safeguards are higher for international relative to 
domestic alliances (β = .75; p < .01). This is consistent with the notion that international alliances 
are generally more difficult to govern as a result of cultural distance and environmental 
uncertainty and thus benefit from more comprehensive contractual stipulations. 
Regarding the effects of trust on alliance performance our results do not provide support  
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for a consistent pattern of moderators across the various performance measures. We found, 
however, that the link between trust and the attainment of alliance objectives is stronger for 
equity than for non-equity alliances (β = .49; p < .05). This suggests that trust and equity 
governance may function as complementary mechanisms for governing strategic alliances. 
Our results also show that the benefits from cooperative behavior are marginally higher 
for international alliances (β = .48; p < .10) suggesting that the partners’ collaborative behavior 
may help overcome cultural differences. Finally, we found that the performance effects of 
alliance age are higher for alliances in manufacturing (β = .78; p < .05), indicating that perhaps 
the benefits from experience accumulation are higher for these type of alliances. 
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TABLE 4.3 
Meta-Analytic Results for the Determinants of Strategic Alliance Performance
a 














Complementarity Attainment  of  objectives  4  257  .19  .23
** .00 .07  .31  .00  87.57  4.57 
 Composite  performance  5  451  .18  .22
** .00 .09  .27  .00  76.95  6.50 
Cultural distance  Composite performance  9  1,146  -.08  -.09
** .01 -.14 -.02  .01  6.70  14.83 
 Economic  performance  3  1,311  -.08  -.10
** .00 -.14 -.03  .00  79.02  3.80 
Prior ties  Attainment of objectives  4  522  .23  .31
** .00 .15  .31  .00  123.72  3.23 
 Composite  performance  9  1,170  .23  .30
** .00 .17  .28  .00  159.04  5.66 
 Economic  performance  3  529  .15  .21
** .00 .06  .23  .00  131.15  2.29 
Governance Structure 
Contractual safeguards  Attainment of objectives  3  378  -.05  -.07  .00  -.15  .05  .00  95.00  3.16 
 Composite  performance  10  1,744  .07  .09
** .01 .03  .12  .01  43.03  23.24
** 
Interorganizational trust  Attainment of objectives  6  529  .48  .58
** .05 .42  .55  .03  18.20  32.96
** 
 Composite  performance  10  1,117  .34  .41
** .01 .29  .39  .01  48.41  2.65
* 
 Economic  performance  4  658  .32  .41
** .01 .25  .39  .01  48.06  8.32
* 
Shared ownership  Attainment of objectives  4  280  .01  .01  .05  -.11  .13  .03  31.17  12.83
** 
 Composite  performance  7  883  -.11  -.14
** .00 -.17 -.04  .00  136.87  5.11 
 Economic  performance  6  2,616  -.07  -.09
** .00 -.11 -.03  .00  77.72  7.69 
Post-Formation Dynamics 
Information exchange  Attainment of objectives  5  374  .27  .33
** .00 .17  .36  .00  165.38  3.02 
 Composite  performance  7  844  .26  .32
** .07 .20  .33  .00  67.59  1.01 
Cooperative behavior  Attainment of objectives  8  728  .33  .41
** .01 .27  .40  .01  61.64  12.98 
 Composite  performance  7  1,065  .40  .49
** .03 .35  .45  .02  21.96  31.88
** 
 Economic  performance  4  905  .27  .35
** .00 .20  .33  .00  352.47  1.13 
Alliance age  Attainment of objectives  6  513  .32  .39
** .03 .24  .40  .02  33.92  17.68
** 
 Composite  performance  10  1,087  .14  .17
** .01 .08  .20  .00  68.33  14.63 
 Economic  performance  7  4,503  .24  .32
** .02 .22  .27  .01  12.30  56.89
** 
a k = number of correlations from independent studies; N = total sample size; Mean r = sample-size-weighted mean uncorrected correlation; ρ = estimate of 
population correlation; Varρ = estimate of the true population variance ρ; CIρ 5% = lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for ρ; CIρ 95% = upper 
bound of the 95% confidence interval for ρ; Residual Var. = residual variance; % Var. explained. = percentage of observed variance accounted for by 
statistical artifacts; Q = chi-square test for heterogeneity. 
* p < .05; 
** p < .01  
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TABLE 4.4 
Results of Weighted Regression Analyses for the Determinants of Strategic Alliance Performance
a 








Contractual safeguards  Composite performance  -.47
† .75
** .14  .42
* 13.21
* 1,744 10 
Interorganizational trust  Attainment of objectives  .49
* -.21  .16  .27  15.25
** 529  6 
Interorganizational trust  Composite performance  -.08  -.31  -.17  .22  13.01
* 1,117 10 
Cooperative behavior  Composite performance  -.33  .48
† -.02  .15  21.34
** 1,065  7 
Alliance age  Attainment of objectives  -.08  -.01  .78
* .68
* 4.61
† 513 6 
Alliance age  Economic performance      .28  .08  13.20
* 4,503  7 
a Cell entries are standardized coefficient estimates. k = number of correlations from independent studies; N = total sample size; Q residual = chi-square test 
for heterogeneity in regression residuals. 
† p < .10 
* p < .05 




Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of Alliance Performance 
In Figure 4.1 we report the results for our hypotheses regarding the determinants of 
alliance performance using OLS regression. Since multiple regression controls for the 
relationships between the independent variables, this analysis provides a more precise test of 
our hypotheses than our previous bivariate analyses. 
Initial conditions. According to Hypothesis 1, the combination of complementary 
resources, capabilities, and activities in the alliance has a positive effect on alliance 
performance. Consistent with this hypothesis, complementarity had a positive effect on both 
the attainment of alliance objectives (β = .19; p < .01) and composite performance (β = .15; p 
< .01). In addition, we predicted that complementarity would not only impact alliance 
performance directly, but also indirectly by influencing the governance structure of the 
alliance. Corroborating Hypotheses 2 we found that complementarity had a positive effect on 
the level of contractual safeguards embedded in the alliance (β = .11; p < .05). Thus, the 
higher the degree of partner interdependence stemming from combining complementarity 
resources and activities, the higher the level of contractual safeguards in the alliance. 
Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 4 and 5 propose that the existence of prior ties between the 
alliance partners would influence the governance structure of the alliance and the post-
formation dynamics between the partners by creating a baseline level of interorganizational 
trust and fostering the development of collaborative routines. Providing support for 
hypothesis 4, our results show that the presence of prior ties had a positive effect on the level 
of interorganizational trust (β = .25; p < .01). Corroborating Hypothesis 3b but not Hypothesis 
3a, we found that prior ties had a positive impact on cooperative behavior (β = .09; p < .05) 
but a negative effect on information exchange (β = -.19; p < .05), respectively. That is, a 
history of prior mutual cooperation between the alliance partners was associated with lower 
rather than higher levels of information exchange. This finding may perhaps reflect the fact  
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that prior alliances provided partners with extensive opportunities for information exchange 
and for the development of collaborative routines which, in turn, attenuate the need for 
intensive exchange of information in subsequent alliances. Contrary to Hypothesis 5, the 
existence of prior ties was associated with higher and not lower levels of contractual 
safeguards (β = .11; p < .05). Thus, we found no evidence for the notion that the accumulated 
trust and joint experience arising from prior ties allow firms to reduce the complexity of 
subsequent contractual arrangements. What the results suggest, instead, is that the knowledge 
obtained from joint collaborative experience is used by firms to refine their subsequent 
contractual agreements, perhaps in an attempt to establish more effective governance 
mechanisms. 
Hypotheses 6 and 7 focused on the potential negative impact that differences in 
national culture between the partners may have on the collaborative relationship and how 
firms may attempt to mitigate these effects by increasing the level of contractual safeguards. 
Interestingly we found that, contrary to Hypothesis 6, the level of cultural distance had a 
positive, rather than negative, effect on interorganizational cooperative behavior (β = .28; p < 
.01). Thus, firms appear to generally respond to cultural differences by engaging in a higher 
level of cooperative behavior with their partners. However, this response is not typically 
effective as indicated by the negative direct effect of cultural distance on alliance 
performance (see Table 4.2). As expected, cultural distance had no impact on the level of 
contractual safeguards in alliances (β = -.03; n.s.). Thus, Hypothesis 7 was not supported. 
Governance structure. Hypotheses 8, 9a, 9b, 10a, and 10b predicted that the 
governance structure of the alliance would be a key determinant of the post-formation 
dynamics between the alliance partners. Hypothesis 8 focused on the role of contractual 
safeguards. It predicted that because more complex contracts create a normative framework 
to deal with a wide range of contingencies and increase predictability and the costs of  
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opportunism, they should promote cooperative behavior. Corroborating this hypothesis, the 
results show that the level of contractual safeguards has a positive effect on cooperative 
behavior (β = .11; p < .01). 
Hypothesis 9a and 9b focused on the structure of incentives associated with a shared 
distribution of equity ownership between the partners, relative to an asymmetric distribution. 
It predicted that shared equity ownership would be associated with higher incentives to 
exchange information and cooperative behavior. Support for our hypotheses was mixed. 
Results show a positive relationship between shared ownership and information exchange (β 
= .22; p < .01), and a nonsignificant link between shared ownership and partner cooperative 
behavior (β = .03; n.s.). Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 9a but not for 9b. Hypotheses 
10a and 10b examined the impact of interorganizational trust on the post-formation 
collaborative behavior of the partnering firms. They predicted a positive effect of trust on 
both information exchange and cooperative behavior, respectively. Consistent with both 
hypotheses, we found a positive relationship between interorganizational trust and the level 
of information exchange (β = .50; p < .01), and between trust and cooperative behavior (β = 
.50; p < .01). Importantly, trust was the determinant that had the strongest effect on the post-
formation level of information exchange and cooperative behavior between the partnering 
firms, suggesting its importance in shaping the evolution of strategic alliances. 
The relative status of trust and contractual safeguards as governance mechanisms was 
tested by examining the direction of this relationship (cf. Poppo and Zenger, 2002). A 
negative relationship between trust and contractual safeguards would show that these two 
governance mechanisms are substitute, whereas a positive relationship would suggest that 
there are complements. Meta-analytic results reported in Table 4.2 show that the bivariate 
relationship between these two variables is nonsignificant (ρ = -.05; n.s.) and that this result is 
homogeneous and thus generalizes across primary studies (Q-statistic = 1.84; n.s.). When  
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examining this relationship while controlling for the effect of other variables, the evidence is 
similar. Results reported in Figure 4.1 show that the level of contractual safeguards has no 
significant effect on interorganizational trust (β = -.07; n.s.), and that trust has a marginally 
significant (β = -.10; p < .07) negative effect on contractual safeguards. Hypotheses 11a and 
11b are not supported. In sum, the meta-analytic evidence suggests that contractual 
safeguards and trust are independent governance mechanisms that evolve and operate in 
parallel. 
Post-formation dynamics. Hypotheses 12a and 12b examined the impact on alliance 
performance of post-formation dynamics between the alliance partners. Specifically, we 
predicted that higher levels of information exchange and cooperative behavior would allow 
partners to fully exploit the potential value arising from combining assets, activities, and 
capabilities in the alliance and would thus lead to higher performance. Consistent with these 
hypotheses, our results show that information exchange and cooperative behavior had a 
positive effect on the attainment of the alliance objectives (βinformation exchange = .25, βcooperative 
behavior = .22 ; p < .01) and composite performance (βinformation exchange = .18, βcooperative behavior = 
.37 ; p < .01). 
Finally, we investigated the effect of alliance age on the partners’ collaborative 
behavior and alliance performance. Our results provide support for the positive effect of 
alliance age on cooperative behavior (β = .15; p < .01), the attainment of alliance objectives 
(β = .39; p < .01) and composite performance (β = .14; p < .01), corroborating Hypotheses 
13b and 13c. We did not find support for Hypothesis 13a as the effect of alliance age on 
information exchange was not significant (β = -.05; n.s.). These findings suggest that, over 
time, partners develop dyadic routines for cooperating and that these routines are beneficial 
for alliance performance.  
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DISCUSSION 
The study of the determinants of alliance performance has been one of the most 
popular topics in research on strategic alliances. However, prior research has emphasized the 
development and testing of new theory rather than the establishment of empirical 
generalizations. Thus, despite extensive research no clear consensus exists regarding the 
antecedents of alliance performance. The present research cumulates 78 empirical studies to 
establish a quantitative synthesis of the influence of initial conditions, governance structure 
and post-formation dynamics on alliance performance. Table 4.5 provides a summary of our 
results. 
To estimate the relative contribution of initial conditions, governance structure, and 
post-formation dynamics in explaining alliance performance we conducted two hierarchical 
regression analyses of the two measures of alliance performance (attainment of alliance 
objectives and composite performance) on all the distinct predictors included in our meta-
analysis. Our results show that, collectively, the determinants investigated account for 67 
percent and 41 percent of the variation in alliance performance measured in terms of 
attainment of objectives and composite performance, respectively. Importantly, all three 
classes of factors contributed to explain heterogeneity in strategic alliance performance. 
Specifically, initial conditions explained 17 percent (F(3,437) = 3.43; p < .01), governance 
structure 27 percent (F(3,434) = 7.06; p < .01), and post-formation dynamics 23 percent 
(F(3,431) = 101.11; p < .01) of the variation in the attainment of alliance objectives. 
Similarly, initial conditions explained 16 percent (F(3,437) = 27.09; p < .01), governance 
structure 11 percent (F(3,434) = 22.02; p < .01), and post-formation variables 14 percent 
(F(3,431) = 34.26; p < .01) of the variation in composite alliance performance. These 
supplementary analyses provide support for the importance of these three different classes of 
factors for understanding alliance performance. Below we summarize and interpret our  
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findings regarding the various determinants of alliance performance and discuss potential 
directions for future research. 
TABLE 4.5 
Summary of results 





Prior ties → Trust  +  0.25
**  Yes 
Contract → Trust  +/-  -0.07  No 
Complementarity → Contract  +  0.11
*  Yes 
Prior ties → Contract  -  0.11
*  No 
Cultural distance → Contract  +  -0.03  No 
Trust → Contract  +/-  -0.10
†  No 
Post-Formation Dynamics 
Prior ties → Information exchange  +  -0.19
**  No 
Trust → Information exchange  +  0.50
**  Yes 
Shared Ownership → Information exchange  +  0.22
**  Yes 
Alliance age → Information exchange  +  -0.05  No 
Prior ties → Cooperative behavior  +  0.09*  Yes 
Cultural distance → Cooperative behavior  -  0.28
**  No 
Trust → Cooperative behavior  +  0.50
**  Yes 
Shared Ownership → Cooperative behavior  +  0.03  No 
Contactual safeguards → Cooperative behavior  +  0.11
**  Yes 
Alliance age → Cooperative behavior  +  0.15
**  Yes 
Strategic Alliance Performance 
Complementarity → Attainment of objectives  +  0.19
**  Yes 
Alliance age → Attainment of objectives  +  0.39
**  Yes 
Information exchange → Attainment of objectives  +  0.25
**  Yes 
Cooperative behavior → Attainment of objectives  +  0.22
**  Yes 
Complementarity → Composite performance  +  0.15
**  Yes 
Alliance age → Composite performance  +  0.14
**  Yes 
Information exchange → Composite performance  +  0.18
**  Yes 
Cooperative behavior → Composite performance  +  0.37
**  Yes 
† p < .10;
* p < .05; 




The meta-analytic evidence reported in this study suggests that the resources 
combined in the alliance are a key factor shaping the formation and performance of the 
strategic alliance. Indeed, we found that complementarity in the assets, activities, and  
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capabilities combined in the alliance influenced its governance structure by increasing the 
level of contractual safeguards and also had a direct impact on alliance performance. 
The development of collaborative routines and a baseline level of trust as a result of a 
prior history of cooperation between the partnering firms also had a relatively strong effect on 
both the governance structure and on the subsequent evolution of the collaborative 
relationship. Specifically, our findings show that the presence of prior ties increases the level 
of interorganizational trust. Remarkably, and contrary to our predictions we found that prior 
ties led to higher, rather than lower, levels of contractual safeguards. This finding is in 
contrast with research suggesting that because prior ties are associated with higher levels of 
mutual trust (e.g., Gulati, 1995) they should reduce the risks of opportunism and lead to 
lower levels of contractual safeguards (e.g., Parkhe, 1993). Our evidence seems to suggest, 
instead, that the increased partner-specific collaborative experience developed over time is 
used to craft more complex and detailed contracts. We also found that prior ties led to lower, 
rather than higher levels of information exchange. This finding may reflect the fact that 
considerable knowledge may have been exchanged between the partners in prior alliances 
and that, as a result, there is a lower knowledge asymmetry between the alliance partners in 
subsequent alliances. In addition, it may also suggest that the development of partner-specific 
collaborative routines may reduce the need for ongoing communication between the alliance 
partners. 
Finally, despite the considerable volume of research examining the impact of cultural 
distance on internationalization and on alliance performance the present research suggests 
that this factor has a limited effect on the formation, evolution, and performance of strategic 
alliances. Our findings show that the cumulative correlation between cultural distance and 
alliance performance is positive, rather than negative, but small. These results are consistent 
with recent meta-analytic evidence by Tihanyi, Griffith, and Russell (2005) suggesting that,  
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on average, cultural distance has no significant effect on entry mode choice, international 
diversification, and the performance of multinational firms. 
Taken together, our findings on the role of initial conditions highlight several 
potential avenues for future research. First, research could extend the range of initial 
conditions beyond those that have been addressed in the present study. Although research 
exists on factors such as the motives underlying alliance formation (e.g., Hatfield and Pearce, 
1994), the degree of relatedness between the partnering firms (e.g., Saxton, 1997), the 
structural chararcteristics of the alliance (Zeng and Hennart, 2002), the partners’ overall 
alliance experience (e.g., Zollo, Reuer and Singh, 2002) and organizational culture distance 
(e.g., Pothukuchi et al., 2002), there were too few empirical studies relating these factors to 
other variables in our model to allow their inclusion in our meta-analysis. Second, the 
unexpected findings regarding the link between prior ties and both contractual safeguards and 
information exchange emphasize the need for new theoretical and empirical work 
investigating in more detail the nature of these relationships and the underlying mechanisms. 
Third, the evidence obtained in this research regarding the limited role of national cultural 
distance, together with similar findings on the impact of this variable on the behavior and 
performance of multinational firms (Tihanyi et al., 2005) suggests that more research is 
needed to understand the role of cultural distance in alliances. 
Governance Structure 
Our meta-analytic findings attest to the importance of governance mechanisms in 
influencing the post-formation dynamics of the alliance and, in turn, its performance. 
Specifically, our findings show that higher levels of trust are associated with higher levels of 
information exchange and cooperative behavior between the partnering firms. We found that 
interorganizational trust was the strongest determinant of the extent of cooperative behavior 
by the alliance partners and of alliance performance. However, we also found that the effect  
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of trust on alliance performance, despite being frequently studied, has produced mixed 
results. Moderator analyses in Table 4.4 indicate that this result is heterogeneous (significant 
Q residuals) and that no consistent pattern of moderators accounts for this heterogeneity. 
Given the centrality of trust as a determinant of alliance performance, future research should 
explore other potential moderating factors beyond those explored here. 
Our findings also emphasize the importance of contractual safeguards and equity 
distribution in shaping collaboration in the alliance. We found that the presence of contractual 
safeguards promotes cooperation between the alliance partners and that a shared equity 
distribution increased information exchange. However, in contrast with the notion that equity 
distribution may influence the structure of incentives to cooperate in the alliance, the meta-
analytic evidence did not find support for a link between these two variables. This may 
perhaps reflect the fact that firms align the equity distribution in the alliance with the 
characteristics of the transaction in order to maximize cooperation. Thus, different ownership 
structures are equally effective as long as a partner’s share of the residual profits of the 
alliance is proportional to its contribution. 
An important debate in the strategic alliance literature is whether trust and contractual 
safeguards are substitutes or complements (e.g., Lui and Ngo, 2004). The cumulative 
evidence in this study suggests the interesting possibility that, rather than being substitute or 
complementary, these two mechanisms may be independent of each other. In other words, the 
processes underlying the development of trust and the design of contractual safeguards 
appear to operate in parallel and do not influence each other. Future research is needed, not 
only on the performance implications of distinct governance structures varying in the levels 
of trust and contractual safeguards, but also on the processes driving the configuration of 
governance structures in strategic alliances.  
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Post-Formation Dynamics 
Finally, our results show that the post-formation collaborative dynamics between the 
alliance partners are key determinants of alliance performance. Indeed both information 
exchange and cooperative behavior had consistent and relatively strong effects on 
performance. Importantly, our results also suggest that, over time, partners tend to develop 
dyadic routines for collaboration and that these routines are beneficial for alliance 
performance. Specifically, our results show that older alliances generally exhibited higher 
levels of performance. These findings emphasize the importance of investigating the 
evolutionary and behavioral aspects of collaboration to fully understand the development and 
performance of strategic alliances. It is, however, important to make two qualifications when 
interpreting these findings. First, most of the studies investigated are based on cross-sectional 
assessments of alliance characteristics and performance which are often based on subjective 
evaluations made by the alliance partners. This raises concerns regarding the causality of the 
relationship between the alliance’s relational attributes and post-formation dynamics and 
alliance performance and the possible operation of common method bias. Indeed, it is 
plausible to assume that in successful alliances the partners’ satisfaction with the outcomes of 
the alliance transfers to their evaluation of the levels of trust, cooperative behavior, and 
information exchange between the partners. Similarly, the measures of trust, cooperative 
behavior and performance used in prior research may be tapping into related dimensions by 
which managers evaluate alliance performance and, as a result, all three constructs may 
reflect managers’ overall evaluation of the alliance. Thus, the observed correlation between 
trust, cooperative behaviors and performance may not necessarily imply that trust and 
cooperative behavior are in fact operating in the alliance and that they were the material 
causal antecedents of performance. Second, the results that we obtained regarding the effects 
of alliance age on performance may reflect the operation of survival bias, rather than the  
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unfolding of developmental processes inherent to interorganizational cooperation (e.g., Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994). Although, performance may vary considerably among young 
alliances, old alliances are not likely to be failures. 
To date our understanding of alliance evolution remains limited. Future research may 
expand the range of variables measuring the post-formation collaborative processes that 
emerge between the alliance partners. In addition, considerable theoretical and empirical 
progress can be made by increasing the focus on longitudinal designs that capture more 
closely the evolutionary dynamics of collaboration. 
In sum, our study is the first to conduct a quantitative synthesis of the extensive 
literature and obtain empirical precise generalizations on the determinants of strategic 
alliance performance. The empirical evidence provides strong evidence for the importance 
and the unique contribution of initial conditions, governance structure, and post-formation 






STRATEGIC ALLIANCES have gradually emerged over the last decades as a primary 
vehicle for corporate growth. Firms increasingly use strategic alliances to enter new markets, 
develop new products, and obtain access to relevant knowledge and technological 
capabilities. However, while alliances can promote growth and create value they can also 
destroy it. Indeed, a number of studies suggest that approximately fifty percent of all alliances 
fail (e.g., Kogut, 1989; Bleeke and Ernst, 1993). Thus, the prevalence of alliances coupled 
with the considerable variation in their success rates has led to an increased effort by both 
scholars and practitioners to find out whether firms benefit from entering alliances and what 
makes for a successful alliance. Yet, despite the large number of studies conducted to date, 
past empirical research provides no consensus on (a) whether, on average, firms benefit from 
entering alliances, (b) why some alliances create more firm value than others, and (c) the 
determinants of the performance of alliances themselves. In this dissertation we used meta-
analysis to address these questions and obtain firm empirical generalizations on the 
performance outcomes of strategic alliances. 
One of the central questions that scholars have asked is whether firms benefit from 
entering strategic alliances. Prior research has generally addressed this question by 
investigating the impact of alliance announcements on the stock market value of the 
partnering firms. For instance, does firm value, on average, increase or decrease in response 
to alliance announcements? In addition, does it matter if the alliance is domestic or 
international, if the partnering firms are active in similar or dissimilar product-market  
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domains, or if the alliance is equity or non-equity? However, determining with precision the 
impact of a specific alliance announcement on a firm’s overall stock market value requires (a) 
measuring the observed change in firm value, and (b) estimating what the stock value would 
have been had the alliance not been announced, that is isolating the effect of the alliance 
announcement from other influences on overall firm value. There are many ways in which 
these issues may be addressed and, therefore, researchers must make a number of 
methodological choices regarding the particular event study approach that is used to estimate 
the alliance announcement–firm value link. Given that there is considerable variation across 
studies in the methodology used, there is the risk that the particular event study methodology 
used may influence the results. If this is the case, then it is difficult to draw conclusions from 
such studies without knowing the potential importance and direction of the bias. To date, 
there has been no systematic investigation on whether the magnitude of estimated abnormal 
returns in event studies is robust to the various methodological choices taken by researchers. 
In Chapter 2 we conducted a meta-analysis to examine how the choice of event study 
methodology influenced the findings of individual studies examining stock market reactions 
to strategic alliance announcements. Our results show that the length of the event window 
systematically influences the magnitude of estimated abnormal returns, with the use of longer 
event windows leading to larger abnormal returns. However, we found that the magnitude of 
the impact of alliance announcements on abnormal returns does not significantly vary with 
the methodology used. Specifically, the exclusion of confounding events, the length of the 
estimation period, and the specification of the return-generating process did not have a 
significant influence on results. Hence, we can be confident that the results of prior empirical 
studies on the impact of alliance announcements on firm value are not systematically 
influenced by the methodology employed. This finding provided the basis for the 
development of Chapter 3.  
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Having established that the observed variation in study findings does not reflect 
methodological differences across studies, we integrated past empirical studies to identify the 
substantive factors that influenced the effect of alliance announcements on firm value. The 
empirical evidence obtained in this chapter contributes toward resolving apparent 
inconsistencies on the direction of this effect. We found that alliances do, on average, create 
value for the partnering firms and that this effect generalizes across equity and non-equity 
modes of governance, manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries, and different time 
periods. However, the cumulative empirical evidence also suggests that there is considerable 
heterogeneity in the performance outcomes of strategic alliances. To address this issue, 
Chapter 3 investigated how the type of interdependencies exploited in an alliance, the 
collaborative conditions between the alliance partners, and organizational experience explain 
why some alliance announcements create more value than others. Overall, our findings lead 
to three main conclusions. First, they show that although strategic alliances are an effective 
governance mechanism for exploiting different types of interdependence between firms, 
value is created under a limited set of conditions. We found, for instance, that firms may 
create value by forming partnerships with local firms to enter new geographic markets, but 
that value creation is highest when the host countries’ economies are moderately integrated 
with those of the investor. We also found that R&D alliances, that pool together knowledge 
and resources to develop new products, are most effective when the governance structure is 
equity-based rather than non-equity based. Overall, the finding that value creation in strategic 
alliances is not only a function of the type of interdependence exploited in the cooperative 
venture, but also of the collaborative conditions present at the inception of the alliance 
highlights the need for developing theoretical models and management practices that take 
these conditions into account. 
Second, the findings reported in Chapter 3 also show that the collaborative conditions  
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between the partnering firms influence the impact of alliances on firm value. We found, for 
instance, that establishing partnerships with foreign governments and that owning a large 
equity share in foreign affiliates have negative effect on value creation. In contrast, the level 
of cultural distance and the prior history of cooperation between the alliance partners had no 
impact on value creation. Finally, we found that the effects of organizational experience on 
value creation depend on the type of experience being accumulated. In particular, whereas 
experience with a host country had a linear positive effect on the link between alliance 
formation and firm value, the effect of experience with alliances was curvilinear (U-shaped). 
Moreover, we found that the effects of both country- and alliance-experience are contingent 
on the governance structure of the alliance, with experience being more beneficial in equity 
rather than non-equity alliances. Taken together, the findings reported in this chapter 
contribute to the identification of the sources and boundaries of value creation in strategic 
alliances. 
Chapter 4 adopts a different level of analysis: it focuses on the determinants of the 
performance of alliances themselves. Whereas research on the link between alliance 
formation and firm value focuses primarily on the types of interdependencies exploited in the 
alliance and the initial collaborative conditions at the inception of the alliance, research on 
the antecedents of alliance performance emphasizes the cooperative processes and post-
formation dynamics that emerge between the partnering firms as key determinants of the 
partnership’s ability to realize value from cooperation. In this chapter we used meta-analysis 
to test an integrative model that investigates the impact of initial conditions, governance 
structure, and post-formation dynamics on alliance performance. First, we found that, 
together, the variables examined in this model accounted for a relatively high proportion of 
variation in alliance performance (between 41 and 67 percent). Second, we found that each of 
these factors accounted for an important proportion of variation in alliance performance. On  
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average, initial conditions explained 16.5 percent, governance structure 19 percent, and post-
formation dynamics 18.5 percent of heterogeneity in alliance performance. This suggests that 
all three classes of factors are important elements in the study and management of alliances. 
Finally, our results provide insights not only on the impact of initial conditions, governance 
structure and post-formation dynamics on alliance performance, but also on the relationships 
between these factors. Specifically, we find that initial conditions such as the level of 
complementarity between the partnering firms and the cultural distance between them 
influence the governance structure of the alliance, and that both the initial conditions and 
governance structure shape, in turn, the post-formation dynamics that emerge between the 
alliance partners. 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Meta-analytic findings are based on an analysis of the cumulative empirical evidence 
on the relationship between two variables. Thus, although meta-analysis is not limited by the 
methodological or substantive characteristics of any particular study, it is limited by the set of 
attributes that are shared across the various studies that comprise a research literature. As a 
result the scope and type of relationships and the potential moderators of these relationships 
that can be investigated depend on how often these relationships have been investigated in the 
literature. This implies that we were only able to focus on a restricted set of determinants of 
the performance outcomes of alliance and a narrow set of moderator variables. For instance, 
although the model proposed in Chapter 3 suggests that the collaborative conditions of the 
alliance and the experience of the partnering firms moderate the link between the type of 
interdependence being exploited in the alliance and the impact of the alliance on firm value, 
the cumulative evidence available did not allow us to fully test this implications of the model. 
Despite these limitations, we were able to identify a number of important contingencies that 
influence value creation in strategic alliances. Particularly, in Chapter 4 we found that the  
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factors investigated accounted for a relatively large proportion of the overall variation in 
alliance performance. 
By establishing a set of empirical generalizations and integrating a large volume of 
empirical research, meta-analysis has the potential not only to clarify what is known but also 
to point out what is not, and thus to stimulate new empirical research. Two major recurring 
themes emerge from the studies presented in this dissertation. First, the determinants of the 
performance outcomes of strategic alliances are multifaceted. Indeed, taken together, the 
findings reported in the preceding chapters show that the performance outcomes of alliances 
are determined by the type of resources combined in the alliance, the governance structure of 
the alliance, the collaborative conditions present at the inception of the alliance, the 
experience of the alliance partners, and the post-formation dynamics between the partnering 
firms. Not only do these factors account for an important proportion of heterogeneity in the 
performance outcomes of alliances, their relative contribution is similar. This suggests that 
theoretical and empirical research on alliances as well as managerial practice requires 
attention to a broad range of factors that jointly influence the ability to create and appropriate 
value through cooperation. Alternatively, scholars may attempt to limit this complexity by 
choosing samples that naturally control for these variations, for example by looking at the 
determinants of performance of vertical alliances in a given industry of a given country. 
Second, our findings are remarkably consistent in suggesting that the effects of most 
antecedents on (a) alliance performance and on (b) the link between alliance announcements 
on firm value are not constant but are instead either non-linear or moderated by other factors. 
This points out to the need for developing a contingency framework for understanding the 
performance outcomes of strategic alliances and for additional research that investigates non-
linearity and potential moderators of value creation in alliances. The research reported in this 
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(SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
STRATEGISCHE ALLIANTIES hebben de afgelopen decennia geleidelijk aan een steeds 
centralere plaats weten te verwerven als instrument voor ondernemingsgroei. Ondernemingen 
zoeken in toenemende mate hun toevlucht tot strategische allianties om nieuwe markten te 
betreden, nieuwe producten te ontwikkelen, en toegang tot relevante kennis en technologische 
capabiliteiten te verkrijgen. Echter, hoewel allianties groei en waardecreatie kunnen bevorderen, 
kunnen ze ook waarde vernietigen. Een aantal studies concludeert zelfs dat ongeveer vijftig 
procent van alle allianties faalt (e.g., Kogut, 1989; Bleeke en Ernst, 1993). De 
alomtegenwoordigheid van allianties, gecombineerd met de aanzienlijke variatie in hun 
slagingskansen, heeft ertoe geleid dat zowel academici als mensen in het bedrijfsleven meer 
inspanningen zijn gaan leveren teneinde een antwoord te vinden op de vraag of ondernemingen 
baat hebben bij het aangaan van allianties en wat een alliantie tot een succes maakt. 
Desalniettemin, ondanks de grote hoeveelheid onderzoek die tot op heden is verricht, bieden 
voorgaande empirische studies geen eenduidige antwoorden op de vragen (a) of de gemiddelde 
onderneming profijt heeft van het aangaan van allianties, (b) waarom sommige allianties meer 
waarde toevoegen aan de onderneming dan anderen, en (c) wat de determinanten zijn van de 
performance van de allianties zelf. In dit proefschrift hebben we met behulp van meta-analyse 
getracht bovenstaande vragen te beantwoorden aan de hand van robuuste empirische 
generalisaties inzake de performance van strategische allianties.  
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De “event study” methodologie is al geruime tijd de meest gebruikelijke methode om de 
effecten van individuele strategische allianties op de waarde van de onderneming te schatten 
(Gulati, 1998). In Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoeken we of de grootte van de geschatte reacties van de 
aandelenmarkt op een gebeurtenis in de onderneming gevoelig is voor de specifieke uitvoering 
van de event study methodologie. Resultaten van een meta-analyse van 110 studies, welke 
gezamenlijk de reacties van de aandelenmarkt op de aankondiging van 32.596 strategische 
allianties onderzoeken, wijzen uit dat geschatte abnormal returns beïnvloed worden door de 
lengte van de event window. Echter, we vinden ook dat bevindingen van event studies 
bovenverwacht robuust zijn tegen variaties in de specificatie van het “return-generating” proces, 
in het controleren voor mogelijke confounding events, in de lengte en het type van de estimation 
window, en in de compositie en het tijdskader van de steekproef. 
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de link tussen de formatie van allianties en de waarde van de 
onderneming. Ondanks het grote aantal studies dat tot dusver is uitgevoerd, is het nog verre van 
duidelijk of en onder welke voorwaarden ondernemingen economische voordelen kunnen 
onttrekken aan strategische allianties. Hoofdstuk 3 biedt een systematische, kwantitatieve 
analyse van twee decennia aan empirisch onderzoek om hieruit gedegen inzichten te distilleren 
omtrent de invloed van de formatie van strategische allianties op de waarde van de onderneming. 
Onze meta-analyse van 110 studies en in totaal 32.596 strategische allianties, aangegaan tussen 
1963 en 2001, leidt tot de krachtige conclusie dat allianties in het algemeen waarde creëren voor 
de betrokken ondernemingen. Bovendien hebben we een meta-analyse uitgevoerd op 78 studies 
(83 onafhankelijke steekproeven; N = 15.439) waarin we de effecten van 14 verschillende 
factoren onderzoeken die de invloed van strategische allianties op de waarde van de 
onderneming bepalen. De bevindingen van deze analyse laten zien dat het type resources dat  
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geëxploiteerd wordt in de alliantie, de omstandigheden waaronder de samenwerking tussen de 
organisaties plaatsvindt, en de ervaring van de samenwerkende ondernemingen cruciale 
antecedenten zijn van waardecreatie. We bespreken de implicaties van deze empirische 
resultaten en bieden aanbevelingen voor verder onderzoek. 
Hoofdstuk 4 richt zich op een ander niveau van analyse: de determinanten van de performance 
van allianties zelf. Terwijl onderzoek naar de link tussen alliantie formatie en de waarde van de 
onderneming (Hoofdstuk 3) zich voornamelijk concentreert op de verschillende typen 
interdependenties die benut worden in de alliantie en de aanvankelijke omstandigheden 
waaronder de samenwerking plaatsvindt bij de totstandkoming van de alliantie, benadrukt 
onderzoek naar de antecedenten van alliantie performance (Hoofdstuk 4) de coöperatieve 
processen en post-formatie dynamiek die zich tussen de betrokken ondernemingen ontwikkelen 
als zijnde toonaangevende determinanten van het vermogen van de partners om waarde te 
creëren middels de samenwerking. In dit hoofdstuk gebruiken we meta-analyse teneinde een 
geïntegreerd model te testen dat de invloed van aanvankelijke omstandigheden, governance 
structuur, en post-formatie dynamiek op alliantie performance onderzoekt. Allereerst vinden we 
dat de variabelen in dit model tezamen een relatief groot aandeel van de variantie in alliantie 
performance verklaart (tussen 41 en 67 procent). Ten tweede wijzen de resultaten uit dat elk van 
de factoren afzonderlijk een belangrijk deel van de variantie in alliantie performance verklaart. 
Aanvankelijke omstandigheden verklaren gemiddeld 16,5 procent, governance structuur 19 
procent, en post-formatie dynamiek 18,5 procent van de heterogeniteit in alliantie performance. 
Dit duidt erop dat alle drie de factoren belangrijke elementen zijn voor het bestuderen en 
daadwerkelijk managen van allianties. Tenslotte bieden onze resultaten niet alleen inzicht in de 
invloed van aanvankelijke omstandigheden, governance structuur, en post-formatie dynamiek op  
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alliantie performance, maar ook in de onderlinge relaties tussen deze factoren. In het bijzonder 
vinden we dat aanvankelijke omstandigheden zoals de mate van complementariteit en de cultural 
distance tussen de samenwerkende ondernemingen de governance structuur van de alliantie 
beïnvloeden en dat zowel de aanvankelijke omstandigheden als de governance structuur, op hun 
beurt, de post-formatie dynamiek vormgeven die zich tussen de alliantie partners afspeelt. Het 
laatste hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift, Hoofdstuk 5, geeft een samenvatting van de belangrijkste 
bevindingen en speculeert over potentiële richtingen voor verder onderzoek. 